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Traditionally, patent and copyright laws have been viewed
as separate bodies of law with distinct utilitarian goals.
Conventional wisdom holds that patent law aims to
incentivize the production of inventive ideas, while copyright
focuses on protecting the original expression of ideas, but not
the underlying ideas themselves. This customary divide
between copyright and patent laws finds some support in the
distinction between "authors" and "inventors," as well as
that between "writings" and "discoveries," in the U.S.
Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause. And Congress,
courts, and scholars have largely perpetuated the divide in
separately enacting, interpreting, and analyzing copyright
and patent laws over time.
This Article argues for partially bridging this traditional
divide between patent and copyright laws. It proposes doing
so by adjusting copyright and patent law defenses and
remedies so that each body of law more explicitly recognizes
and facilitates the purposes of the other. In particular, in
some copyright cases that implicate technological innovation,
copyright law's fair use defense would be well served by
incorporating patent law principles relating to obviousness
and novelty in assessing whether some technology's use of
copyrighted works is a fair use. Furthermore, injunctive
relief standards under patent law should expressly take into
account how granting patent law remedies may affect
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copyrightable creative activities.
At least three reasons justify abandoning the conventional
divide between copyright and patent laws in pursuit of such
intellectual property law hybridization. First, the traditional
divide fails to take into account the increasingly
interdependent relationship between creative and inventive
efforts prevalent in today's world. Second, the traditional
divide ignores much modern neurobiological, psychological,
and cultural research. This research shows that the creative
processes that lead to both copyrightable expression and
patentable invention are often so intertwined as to make
neatly dividing and facilitating them under separate bodies
of law difficult. And third, some recent scholarship suggests
that, based on the historical record, the Constitution's
Intellectual Property Clause is best interpreted as assuming
interdependencies between creative and inventive activities.
This Article concludes by suggesting that hybridization
efforts may be warranted not only in the intellectual property
realm, but also within the law more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
When the Wright brothers developed their methods for
flight, their clear choice for preventing others from using their
flight methods was patent law.1 But when J.K. Rowling wrote
the Harry Potter series, her primary means of stopping
copycats was and remains copyright law.2 Why the difference?
Traditionally, patent and copyright laws have been conceived of
1. See generally LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, BIRDMEN: THE WRIGHT BROTHERS,
GLENN CURTISS, AND THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE SKIES (2014).
2. See generally ROBERT S. WANT, HARRY POTTER AND THE ORDER OF THE
COURT: THE J.K. ROWLING COPYRIGHT CASE AND THE QUESTION OF FAIR USE
(2008).
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as separate bodies of law with distinct objectives; they are
meant to encourage and protect different types of activities. 3
Patent law generally aims to incentivize parties to develop new
and non-obvious utilitarian inventions, such as (at the time)
the Wright brothers' methods of flight.4 Patent law's primary
mechanism for encouraging such activity consists of providing
inventors like the Wright brothers with exclusive rights to
their inventive ideas. 5
Copyright law, conversely, seeks to foster original, creative
expression. It does so by providing authors with exclusive
rights to their original expression of ideas.6 But copyright
protection does not extend to the underlying ideas themselves,
nor to the utilitarian or functional aspects of creative works.7
Hence, copyright law provided the Wright brothers with little if
any recourse for protecting their inventive ideas relating to
flight. Nor can Rowling rely on copyright to protect the general
idea of a book on wizardry. Rowling can, however, look to
copyright to prevent others from copying her literal text, as
well as some other elements of her works that may constitute
her original, creative expression.
This bifurcated understanding of copyright and patent
laws is rooted in historical conceptions of the constitutional
basis for copyright and patent laws.8 And over time, Congress,
courts, and scholars have largely perpetuated this customary
divide in implementing, interpreting, and theorizing each body
of law.9 Indeed, prior scholarship has not only treated the
divide as fixed, but in some cases has called for bolstering it.10
3. See generally infra Section I.A.
4. See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012) (setting forth patent law's
novelty and non-obviousness requirements).
5. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (setting forth the basic rights of
patent holders).
6. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012) (setting forth the basic rights of
copyright holders).
7. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012) (expressly carving out from copyright
protection "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work").
8. See, e.g., Dotan Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A New
Reading, 57 UCLA L. REV. 421, 463-64 (2009).
9. See generally infra Section I.A.
10. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/Patent Boundary, 48 U. RICH. L.
REV. 611 (2014) (arguing for eliminating copyright protection for industrial design
generally, which, she argues, is more appropriately protected by patent law
[Vol. 8768
IP HYBRIDIZATION
But what happens when something-say, software, or the
design of a car-includes both utilitarian and creative
elements? The general approach has been to maintain the
traditional divide by granting patents to the utilitarian
elements of the work, and copyright to the creative parts
thereof." But effectively implementing this divide when the
utilitarian and creative elements of a work are significantly
intertwined has proven to be a difficult task for courts, and the
legal precedents in such contexts are often unsatisfying as a
result. 12
The traditional divide between copyright and patent laws
also ignores the increasingly interdependent realities of
creative and inventive activities. In today's world, technological
innovations facilitate more and more creative activity, and
vice-versa.1 3 The explosion of software "apps" featuring creative
content in response to the development of mobile technologies
is a clear example of technological innovation fueling creative
activity. 14 And that increased creative activity in turn fuels
additional technological innovation. The development of Netflix
and other streaming technologies, for instance, are
technological innovations spurred in part by the desire to
monetize the growing amount of creative content available.15
Given these interdependent relationships, should someone
with a patent on, say, podcasting technology be able to stop all
podcasts from being created? Or should copyright holders be
able to prevent the development of new technological
innovations, such as peer-to-peer file-sharing technologies,
simply because those technologies can be and are used to
alone); J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright
Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2444-46 (1994) (arguing that copyright and
patent laws have been expanded to cover objects for which they were not
intended, and suggesting that such legal hybrids are a negative development).
I1. See generally infra Section I.A.
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. See infra Section II.B.
14. For instance, Apple's introduction of mobile technologies relating to its
App Store has spawned the creation of millions of apps, many of which feature
creative content. See Sarah Perez, App Store Downloads Top 85 Billion, Revenue
Up 36 Percent Year-Over-Year, TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 20, 2014), http://techcrunch.
com/2014/10/20/app-store-downloads-top-85-billion/ [http://perma.cc/ZG26-MK7C].
15. A Brief History of Netflix, CNN (July 21, 2014, 6:06 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/21/showbiz/gallery/netflix-history/ [http://perma.cc/
7HGS-9KV8] (indicating that Netflix was founded, in part, in order to use the
Internet to rent movies to consumers).
2016] 69
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infringe copyrights? Scholars have wrestled with these types of
questions for some time. 16 But they have often struggled to
offer a coherent theory as to why copyright law should take
into account its effects on technological innovation, which is
generally viewed as the domain of patent law, or why patent
law should consider its implications for creative activity, which
is generally seen as the province of copyright law. 17
This Article offers intellectual property law hybridization
as a way out of such intellectual property morasses. In other
words, it argues that partially bridging the traditional divide
between copyright and patent laws is a promising way to better
take into account the interdependent realities of creative and
inventive activities. Hence, patent law should explicitly aim to
facilitate expressive activity, and copyright law should be
augmented in ways that expressly support inventive
innovation. One promising way to achieve this type of
hybridization is by adjusting defenses and remedies under each
body of law. For instance, patent law remedies should more
explicitly take into account their potential effects on creative
activities. And copyright law's fair use defense should, in
certain cases implicating technological innovation, expressly
incorporate patent law principles relating to obviousness and
novelty in assessing whether some technology's use of
copyrighted works is a fair use.
Other scholars have previously argued in favor of various
intellectual property law reforms based on comparing the
different bodies of intellectual property law. 18 But in most
16. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story,
2012 WIs. L. REV. 891 (discussing how certain copyright law decisions negatively
affected the pace and direction of technological innovation); Edward Lee,
Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797 (2010) (discussing how copyright
law might be reformed in order to better protect technological innovation).
17. See infra Section II.B and Part III.
18. See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L.
REV. 719 (2009) (arguing for reforming patent law's claiming features to be more
in line with copyright law's claiming doctrines); Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A.
Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1251, 1299-1301 (2014) (suggesting certain reforms to patent law based on
comparing the advantages that copyright law has in similar areas); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177
(2000) (proposing a fair use exception for patent law); Katherine J. Strandburg,
Patent Fair Use 2.0, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 265 (2011) (same); Samson Vermont,
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 MICH. L. REV. 475
(2006) (advocating for adoption of an independent invention defense to patent
70 [Vol. 87
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cases, these proposals focus on borrowing concepts and
doctrines from other areas of intellectual property law in order
to improve another body of intellectual property law in
achieving its own distinct purposes. In essence, such proposals
argue for doctrinal borrowing between the distinct bodies of
law in order to maintain and improve intellectual property
law's bifurcated reality. They fall short, however, of arguing
that copyright law should explicitly address its effects on
inventive activities, or that patent law should directly concern
itself with encouraging copyrightable creative activities. This
latter type of hybridization, in contrast, is the focus of this
Article.
Some scholars have come closer to arguing in favor of some
degree of melding between the distinct bodies of intellectual
property law. 19 Yet, even those accounts fall short of suggesting
that patent law should include as one of its explicit tenets a
focus on facilitating copyrightable creative activity, or that
copyright law should actively seek to promote inventive
activity. Instead, they typically argue that copyright law should
avoid impeding innovation when possible, largely on the basis
of First Amendment free speech values.20 But that type of
argument falls short of this Article's solution, which is that
patent and copyright law should each explicitly incorporate
within their corpuses the purposes of the other.
One significant factor justifying such intellectual property
law hybridization is the interdependent nature of many
creative and innovative activities in the modern world. As
briefly mentioned above, creative output and the commercial
possibilities associated with it increasingly spur innovative
efforts, and innovation increasingly fosters creative outputs
and commercial opportunities related to them. Furthermore,
much modern neurobiological, psychological, and cultural
infringement). See generally infra Section I.B. 1.
19. See, e.g., Carrier, supra note 16 (setting forth a number of proposed
reforms to copyright law that may help foster innovation); Peter DiCola,
Copyright Equality: Free Speech, Efficiency, and Regulatory Parity in
Distribution, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1837 (2013) (proposing equal treatment for the
various distribution technologies so as to avoid slowing innovation); Lee, supra
note 16 (proposing modifying copyright law's fair use doctrine in order to better
take into account its effects on technological innovation); See generally infra
Section I.B.2.
20. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 16, at 813-18.
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research suggests that creativity and invention are highly
interrelated processes that are not easily divvied up under
either body of law.21
Hence, without explicit adjustments in each body of law
that seek to adapt to these interdependent relationships, each
body of law fails to be as instrumental as it could be in
fostering the "Progress of Science and [the] useful Arts," the
constitutional basis for copyright and patent laws in the first
place.22
Hybridizing both patent and copyright laws in order to
account for the relationships between creative and inventive
activities also better aligns each body of law with the
predominant utilitarian theory behind the Constitution's
Intellectual Property Clause. This theory generally posits that
intellectual property rights are granted as incentives to create
and invent that which would not be developed or publicly
disclosed without granting those rights.23 By facilitating the
interdependent realities of creative and inventive activities,
intellectual property law hybridization would provide
additional incentives for both creative and inventive activity,
thereby arguably offsetting whatever weakening of incentives
that may occur as a result of such hybridization.
The Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause also
arguably supports such hybridization efforts. That is, although
traditionally the constitutional provision authorizing copyright
and patent law has been interpreted to align inventors with
"discoveries" and the progress of the "useful Arts," and authors
with "writings" and the progress of "Science," nothing in the
21. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing
Conceptions of Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283
(2010) (reviewing psychological, neurobiological, and cultural research that
suggests that artists and inventors both rely on the same creative faculties in
producing new works, and arguing on this basis that joint inventor and joint
authorship laws under patent and copyright law, respectively, should be more
similar than they actually are); Erez Reuveni, Copyright, Neuroscience, and
Creativity, 64 ALA. L. REV. 735 (2013) (arguing that copyright law fails to take
into account modern neuroscience and psychology research on how creativity
occurs and suggesting how copyright may better take such research into account).
See generally infra Section II.B.
22. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
23. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8772
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Constitution itself mandates this dichotomy.24 Instead, the
interdependent realities of creative and innovative activities
suggest that a hybridized interpretation is a better one. And
according to some recent scholarship, the history behind the
Clause's adoption provides some validation for such a take on
the Clause's meaning. 25
None of this is to say that traditional intellectual property
law bifurcation is without merit in many cases. But
maintaining these distinct bodies of law does not require either
body of law to ignore the purposes of the other. Indeed, good
reasons exist for the opposite result, namely, that each body of
law should do all in its power to actively promote the
traditionally distinct purposes of the other. And when some
area of technology, such as software, defies easy categorization
into either the patent or copyright bucket, each body of law
should adapt to that reality, too. In sum, the benefits of both
intellectual property law hybridization and bifurcation can and
should coexist.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I reviews traditional
accounts of copyright and patent laws as separate bodies of law
with distinct purposes. It also reviews recent literature that
argues that copyright and patent law should become more
similar in a variety of ways. It demonstrates how such
proposals typically aim to improve each body of law in realizing
its own distinct purposes, rather than hybridizing the bodies of
law in order to facilitate the innovative proclivities of copyright
law or the creative faculties of patent law. And in cases where
the proposals do argue in favor of something closer to
intellectual property law hybridization, Part I shows that they
often lack a coherent theory for why copyright should actively
seek to foster inventive activity, or why patent law should be
concerned with the purposes behind copyright law.
Part II then reviews the mounting evidence highlighting
the strong interrelationships between creative and innovative
activities. In particular, it examines studies that review such
interdependencies, research on the often inseparable nature of
creativity and invention, as well as some representative real-
world examples of these dynamics at play. These
interdependencies, this Article argues, provide significant
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; infra Section I.C.
25. See Oliar, supra note 8, at 465-69.
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reasons for pursuing copyright and patent law hybridization.
Part II also reviews recent scholarship assessing the history
behind the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause, which
history also arguably supports such hybridization efforts.
Part III turns to some recent proposals from others that,
either explicitly or implicitly, seek to incorporate into patent
law and copyright law changes that may facilitate the purposes
of the other body of law. These proposals, however, fall short of
arguing in favor of intellectual property law hybridization as
articulated in this Article and thus fall short of promising the
benefits that such hybridization would provide. Part III
therefore suggests additional changes to these proposals that
would help achieve intellectual property law hybridization. It
then applies these reformed proposals to two real-world
examples: the first involves a significant copyright dispute
between Oracle and Google, and the second relates to a patent
dispute between "patent assertion entities" (often referred to as
"patent trolls") and podcasters.
The Article concludes by suggesting that legal
hybridization efforts could prove useful not only within the
intellectual property law sphere, but in broader areas of the
law as well.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW BIFURCATION
As briefly discussed above, patent and copyright laws have
been traditionally viewed as separate bodies of law serving
distinct purposes. Section L.A below reviews traditional
accounts of this bifurcation. Section I.B then examines recent
proposals arguing in favor of adapting each body of law to
make each more compatible with the other. However, as
Section I.B will show, such efforts most typically aim to
improve each body of law in pursuing its distinct purposes,
rather than hybridizing each body of law in order to facilitate
the purposes of the other. And where the proposals do aim at
some form of harmonization, they often lack a coherent theory
supporting this conceptual move. Later, Parts II and III argue
that this latter form of hybridization should be a goal of
intellectual property law more generally because of the
interrelationships between creative and inventive activities.
[Vol. 8774
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A. Traditional Accounts of Intellectual Property Law
Bifurcation
Conventionally, the Constitution's Intellectual Property
Clause has been understood to include authority for Congress
to establish two distinct bodies of law: copyright and patent
law. 26 Copyright law, by securing to authors exclusive rights in
their "Writings," is meant to "promote the Progress of Science,"
while patent law, by granting inventors exclusive rights in
their "Discoveries," is meant to promote the "Progress of . . .
[the] useful Arts."27 Thus, according to the majoritarian view,
the U.S. Constitution itself provides a basis for Congress to
implement two separate bodies of law with distinct objectives.28
Congress, in enacting both copyright and patent laws, has
largely followed some form of this bifurcation in its handiwork.
According to the Copyright Act, copyright applies to "original
works of authorship" that are "fixed in any tangible medium of
expression" from which they can be "perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated." 29 The Copyright Act makes clear,
however, that copyright does not apply to any "idea, procedure,
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery," no matter how described. 30 Patent law is the
appropriate body of law for protecting these domains. 31 The
Copyright Act goes on to specify that "useful articles" are
exempt from copyright protection to the extent that they
include intrinsic utilitarian functions that cannot be separated
from the aesthetic qualities of the work.32 Again, such items
26. Oliar, supra note 8, at 463-64.
27. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
28. Id. See also Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the
Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50, 54 (1949)
(arguing that patent law was implemented in order to promote the progress of the
"useful Arts").
29. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
30. Id. § 102(b).
31. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55-57 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5668-70 (indicating that the exceptions to copyrightability listed under
section 102(b) are meant to preserve the basic dichotomy in copyright law where
the expression of ideas is protected, but the underlying ideas themselves are not);
NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 20
(1978) (indicating that processes relating to how a computer program operates are
protectable, if at all, under patent law, but are exempt from copyright protection).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining "useful articles").
2016] 75
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are the province of patent law, if any.33
Patent law picks up where copyright leaves off. The Patent
Act stipulates that patents may be granted on "any new and
useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter," including improvements thereof, so long as the patent
applicant meets all other statutory requirements of the Patent
Act. 34 Patent law, therefore, aims to foster the development of
new, useful, and inventive ideas by granting inventors
exclusive rights in them.35
While some scholars have questioned this traditional
bifurcation,36 courts typically have not. 37 Of course, courts do
not always bifurcate the constitutional purposes behind each
body of law in their analyses. For instance, many cases point to
the progress of both science and the useful arts as the purpose
behind copyright or patent law or both. 38 Yet, because courts
are interpreting distinct bodies of statutory law in their legal
analyses, the different functions assigned to each body of law
naturally direct those analyses. Indeed, to some extent
Congress's separation of patent law from copyright law, and
the statutory and common law limitations of each, requires as
33. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55-57 (specifying that the useful article
doctrine operates to prevent monopolization of functional works under copyright
law).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
35. An important caveat is that patents may not be granted to "abstract
ideas," which are a common law exception to patentable subject matter. Instead,
application of an abstract idea must include some "inventive step" in order to
qualify as patentable subject matter. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct.
2347 (2014).
36. Oliar, supra note 8, at 465-69.
37. In the U.S. Supreme Court's Eldred v. Ashcroft copyright decision, for
instance, Justice Breyer in dissent indicated that copyright's purpose is to
promote the progress of science, by which the framers meant "learning or
knowledge." 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing E.
WALTERSCHEID, THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 125-26 (2002)); see also Interpart Corp. v. Italia, 777
F.2d 678, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (indicating that patent law focuses on promoting
the progress of useful arts by granting patent rights) overruled on other grounds
by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999);
In re Flint, 330 F.2d 363, 368 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (indicating that patent law's
objective is to promote the useful arts).
38. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,
477 (1984) (indicating that the purpose of copyright is to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts); Woodbridge v. United States, 263 U.S. 50, 55 (1923)
(indicating that the purpose behind patent law is to promote the progress of




For instance, in the copyright realm, courts have relied on
an idea-expression dichotomy in assessing which parts of a
work are eligible for copyright protection. 39 In Baker v. Selden,
the U.S. Supreme Court elaborated on this doctrine, holding
that the ideas underlying the "useful art"-in this case,
bookkeeping-were not eligible for copyright protection; only
the author's original description of the ideas could obtain such
protection. 40 The Court reasoned that patent law, not copyright
law, may grant exclusive rights to such ideas.41 In a later case,
the Supreme Court again reasoned that, while patents may
protect ideas and principles underlying inventions, copyright
only protects the author's original expression of such ideas.42
Courts have developed a number of related doctrines under
copyright law whose basic purpose is to help maintain this
idea-expression dichotomy. For example, under the merger
doctrine, courts prohibit copyright protection for the expression
of ideas where only one or a limited number of ways to express
that idea exist.43 In such cases, the idea is said to merge with
the expression, whereby copyright protection ceases. 44
Relatedly, under the scenes & faire doctrine, courts deny
copyright protection for certain elements of an otherwise
original work where those elements are mandatory or typical in
the treatment of a given topic. 45 For example, literature
describing salmon will almost of necessity describe the many
miles salmon swim, how they overcome waterfalls and hungry
bears in their exoduses, and how some of them ultimately
39. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the
Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work's 'Total Concept and Feel,'
38 EMORY L.J. 393, 395 (1989) (reviewing this doctrine generally).
40. 101 U.S. 99, 102, 104, 106 (1879).
41. Id. at 102-05.
42. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954).
43. See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[BI[3].
44. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th
Cir. 1971) ("When the 'idea' and its 'expression' are thus inseparable, copying the
'expression' will not be barred, since protecting the 'expression' in such
circumstances would confer a monopoly of the 'idea' upon the copyright owner free
of the conditions and limitations imposed by the patent law.").
45. Michael D. Murray, Copyright, Originality, and the End of the Scones &
Faire and Merger Doctrines for Visual Works, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 779, 781-84
(2006) (providing a summary of the doctrine and citing to cases applying it).
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return to their original spawning pools. 46 These elements, even
when employing the author's original expression to describe
them, are not copyrightable because the underlying ideas are
part of the public domain.47 They are familiar, necessary ideas
that others are free to employ in their own works relating to
salmon.48
Patent law also reflects this traditional bifurcation in a
number of ways. For instance, under patent law, technically
only one patent is supposed to issue for any given inventive
idea.49 While patents may issue on inventive improvements to
an underlying invention, the improver must still obtain rights
from the original inventor in order to practice the underlying
invention as part of their improvement. 50 Hence, unlike
copyright law, where anyone is free to use ideas underlying a
creative work, patent law reflects a different objective:
protecting inventive ideas by granting exclusive rights to
them. 51 And technically only one party is supposed to own a
patent covering a distinct inventive idea, which patent that
party can then use to prevent anyone else in the relevant
jurisdiction from practicing inventive idea.52
Patent law's doctrine of equivalents is an additional
measure that courts have developed in order to better protect
inventive ideas under patent law. 53 For instance, if any
subsequent inventor were able to circumvent a patented
invention by substituting one or even a few inconsequential
elements not explicitly covered in the patent claims, then the
patent system and the incentives it is supposed to provide in
46. Id. at 793.
47. Id. at 793-94.
48. Id. at 791.
49. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1627-29 (2003) (discussing the problem of patent thickets,
where overlapping patent rights may erroneously apply because of improvidently
issued patents covering the same technology or through expansive application of
patent law's doctrine of equivalents).
50. Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown:
The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75, 80 (1994).
51. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (laying out the basic exclusive rights of a
patent holder).
52. Id.; Burk & Lemley, supra note 49.
53. Charles W. Adams, The Doctrine of Equivalents: Becoming a Derelict on
the Waters of Patent Law, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1113, 1122-36 (2006) (providing a case-
by-case summary of the doctrine's evolution).
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promoting innovation may be rather hollow. 54 In order to
address this concern, U.S. courts have over time developed the
doctrine of equivalents in order to expand a patent's coverage
beyond what the patent document may expressly cover. 55 While
some fear that such a doctrine may in certain cases provide
patent owners with excessive patent protection, 56 the doctrine
has remained intact as a means of protecting patent owners
from others being able to copy their patented inventive ideas
simply because the patent owners lacked perfect foresight in
drafting their patent applicationS. 57
These doctrines thus make clear that one of patent law's
primary objectives is to do what copyright law cannot: grant
exclusive rights to ideas and principles underlying otherwise
qualifying inventions. And in order to help ensure that patent
law adequately protects such inventive ideas, courts have
developed doctrines like the doctrine of equivalents as aids in
achieving these objectives.
Interestingly, patent law does provide parties with the
ability to claim exclusive rights in the design of goods that a
patent applicant has developed.58 Such rights come in the form
of design patents, which, some argue, overlap with the rights
and prerogatives of copyright law. 59 Indeed, design patents
54. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 77-78 (2004).
55. Adams, supra note 53.
56. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement
and Patent Claim Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93
GEO. L.J. 1947 (2005) (articulating an alternative theoretical justification for the
doctrine of equivalents, which would mandate that the doctrine should apply as
an exception rather than the rule, in order to better balance the benefits of
patents with the potential harms that an unbridled doctrine of equivalents
causes).
57. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(stating that the doctrine "temper[s] unsparing logic and prevent[s] an infringer
from stealing the benefits of an invention").
58. 35 U.S.C § 171 (2012) (setting forth the basic rights of a design patent
holder).
59. Application of Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (recognizing
the overlap between copyright and design patents, but nonetheless holding that a
party need not elect between the two). See generally Laura A. Heymann,
Overlapping Intellectual Property Doctrines: Election of Rights Versus Selection of
Remedies, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 239 (2013) (describing the overlap between
design patents and copyright generally); Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and
Bachdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1518-20, 1530 (2004) (outlining the problems that
arise from intellectual property law overlap and suggesting that only one form of
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grant exclusive rights in the aesthetic, nonfunctional qualities
of an article of manufacture, rather than the utilitarian ideas
behind it.60
While design patents might be viewed as a form of legal
hybridization between the two bodies of law, such a conclusion
is questionable for at least two reasons. First, design patents
only apply to articles of manufacture. 6 1 Copyright, conversely,
applies much more broadly to a variety of different types of
creative content. 62 Thus, even if the existence of design patents
is viewed as a form of hybridization between copyright and
patent law, it is a particularly narrow form thereof.
Second, and even more importantly for purposes of this
Article, the overlap between design patents and copyright is
not the type of legal hybridization that best fosters the
interdependencies between creative and innovative activities
that this Article explores in Part II below. Indeed, other
scholars have noted that such overlapping protections can work
at cross-purposes given that each set of rights includes
different rights, exceptions, and limitations.63 Thus, when
multiple types of protection apply to any given form of
expression, the public is deprived in some cases of the basic
bargain that copyright and patent law, respectively, are
supposed to provide. 64
Copyright, for instance, includes the important "fair use"
exception to infringement, which allows for a variety of uses of
a copyrighted work despite such uses technically infringing the
author's copyright rights.65 But if the author of the copyrighted
features also obtained a design patent covering the same
features of the work, then the patent may bar uses of the work
protection is likely necessary in order to incentivize creation of the expression).
60. Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, Design Patents: Law Without Design, 17
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 277, 281 (2013).
61. 35 U.S.C. § 171; Lee & Sunder, supra note 60, at 281.
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
63. Moffat, supra note 59, at 1519-20.
64. Id.; cf. Mark P. McKenna, An Alternate Approach to Channeling? 51 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 873 (2009) (discussing the problems of overlapping intellectual
property protections for the same objects generally and suggesting that forcing
intellectual property owners to elect among different types of protection may help
avoid some of these problems).




that, under copyright law, may be deemed "fair uses" thereof.66
Hence, though design patents may provide additional
incentives to create original designs, they may also upset the
balance of rights and exceptions under copyright law that
policymakers and the courts have deemed best meet the
purposes of copyright. Such legal hybridization thus not only
fails to foster interdependencies between creative and
innovative activities that may otherwise exist, but in some
cases may undermine them.
In sum, the patent-copyright dichotomy remains intact in
most important respects. Relying on a traditional
understanding of the Constitution's basic divide between
copyright and patent law, Congress and the courts have
perpetuated that split through legislative action and the
development of common law doctrines. In the case of patent
law, some overlapping protections exist in the form of design
patents.67 But such overlap may actually make the traditional
divide less useful rather than successfully bridge it. The next
sections turn to exploring how scholars have historically
treated this divide in analyzing the relationship between
copyright and patent laws.
B. Non-Hybridization Proposals
As Section I.B.1 below will examine, other scholars have
argued in favor of various intellectual property law reforms
that seek to improve the functioning of copyright and patent
law by looking to the other body of law for doctrines and
concepts. However, these proposals typically aim to improve
the different bodies of intellectual property law in achieving
their distinct purposes, rather than aiming to hybridize them.
Hence, though in some cases the proposals appear promising,
66. Moffat, supra note 59, at 1519-20.
67. Trademark, another form of intellectual property protection, may also, in
some cases, provide overlapping protections in cases where copyright and patent
rights already exist, or even where those rights are not applicable or have expired.
See generally Mark P. McKenna, What's the Frequency, Kenneth? Channeling
Doctrines in Trademark Law, in 3 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 215 (2007). It is beyond the
scope of the current Article to discuss whether trademark law should also be
hybridized with patent and copyright law, though many of the reasons discussed
in this Article justifying hybridization between copyright and patent law may also
justify hybridizing trademark rights.
2016] 81
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
their objective falls short of hybridizing each of copyright and
patent law in order to better facilitate the purposes of the
other.
Section I.B.2 will then turn to other scholarly proposals
that come closer to arguing in favor of hybridizing patent and
copyright laws. However, as Section I.B.2 will demonstrate,
these proposals often lack a coherent theory for why copyright
should actively seek to foster inventive activity, or why patent
law should be concerned with the purposes behind copyright
law.
1. Maintaining the Dichotomy
In recent years, a growing number of intellectual property
scholars have argued in favor of doctrinal borrowing between
the different bodies of intellectual property law. For instance,
several prominent scholars have recently argued that both
patent law and trademark law could learn from copyright law
in adopting some of its infringement standards. 68 Specifically,
these scholars suggest that both patent law and trademark law
would benefit by requiring intellectual property owners to show
that an allegedly infringing work is both technically similar to
their own from the perspective of an expert and that the
allegedly infringing use causes market harm.69 The authors
point to copyright law, which does incorporate these principles
at different points in a copyright infringement analysis, as a
possible model for both patent and trademark law reform.70
Yet, though this recommendation may make some sense,
its primary aim is not to hybridize the bodies of law in order to
make patent and trademark law more conducive to the
purposes of copyright law, and vice-versa. Instead, the proposal
aims to make each body of law better equipped at achieving its
own purposes.
Other scholarship often follows this general template for
intellectual property law crossbreeding. For instance, another
recent study argues that patent law would benefit by adopting
"claiming elements" more typical in the copyright context. 7 1 In
68. Fromer & Lemley, supra note 18, at 1299-1301.
69. Id. at 1255.
70. Id. at 1299-1301.
71. Fromer, supra note 18.
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other words, patent law as currently implemented often results
in issued patents that fail to put the public on sufficient notice
of what the patent covers, are excessively expensive to draft,
and at times have negative impacts on later developed
technologies. 72 This is so because patent law predominantly
relies on a system of peripheral claiming by characteristic in
order to provide the bounds of any given patent.73 That is,
patents attempt to delineate their bounds by listing the
essential features of the covered invention. This delineation is
then supposed to allow any member of the public to determine
whether any particular embodiment falls within the patent
scope. 74 But in practice, patents often fail in this quest,
resulting in wasteful claim drafting exercises and in some cases
deleterious effects on technologies developed after the patent
claims were drafted.75
This study offers as a possible cure to this problem that
patent law be tweaked to adopt the predominant claiming
modes present in copyright law.76 Copyright law's "central
claiming" or "claiming by exemplar" system sets forth a
prototypical member of a class of things that is clearly
protected under the relevant legal regime. Other embodiments
are then compared to that prototype in order to determine
whether it is similar enough to also fall within the same set of
rights. 77 Although some instances of this type of claiming
already exist in patent law, patent law would benefit, according
to this study, by relying on central claiming more frequently.78
But again, the objective in proposing this type of
intellectual property law reform is not to explicitly foster the
purposes of copyright law under patent law. Instead, the
proposal's aim is to make patent law better at doing its job of
promoting inventive innovation.79
Over the years, several scholars have argued that patent
law would benefit by adopting a "fair use" type of defense
72. Id. at 726-27, 772-75.
73. Id. at 772.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 772-75.
76. Id. at 775-81.
77. Id. at 726-27.
78. Id. at 775-81.
79. Id. at 772.
2016] 83
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
similar to what copyright law includes.80 Copyright law's "fair
use" defense to copyright infringement privileges certain types
of uses that otherwise technically infringe an author's rights
under copyright.8 ' Such uses are "privileged" because they tend
to further the purposes of copyright and thus deserve, from a
public policy standpoint, special consideration. 82
Scholars in favor of a patent fair use exception to patent
infringement argue that such an exception could play a similar
role under patent law. 83 That is, providing for a fair use
defense to patent infringement could allow patent law to
respond more flexibly to a variety of scenarios where patent
law as currently applied often results in excessively harsh
results on users of patented inventions. 84
Nevertheless, the purpose behind such a move is to better
account for changes in the marketplace that may make patents
less relevant or difficult to license, rather than to foster the
purposes of copyright-even if promoting the purposes of
copyright is a side benefit of such a reform. 85 In short, such
proposals seek to improve patent law in achieving its own
purposes, not to improve its capacity to meet the objectives of
copyright.
Several scholars, including the author of this Article, have
also advocated that patent law adopt another copyright law
tenet: an independent development defense to infringement. 86
Under copyright law, if two authors independently create the
same or similar original works of authorship, one of those
authors cannot sue the other for copyright infringement, even
if she authored the work well before the other.8 7 So long as the
80. See, e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 18 (proposing a fair use exception for
patent law); Strandburg, supra note 18 (same).
81. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 65.
82. Traditional categories of uses that have qualified as fair use under
copyright include using copyrighted works for purposes of criticism, news
reporting, parody, teaching, scholarship, and research. More Information on Fair
Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., http://copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html [http://
perma.cc/JRT4-XLSV].
83. Strandburg, supra note 18, at 279-87.
84. Id. at 292.
85. Id. at 293-96.
86. Vermont, supra note 18, at 484-89 (2006) (advocating for adoption of an
independent invention defense to patent infringement); Clark D. Asay, Enabling
Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. REV. 431, 487-94 (2015) (proposing a conditional
independent invention defense to patent infringement).
87. See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent Law,
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other author actually independently created the work, she is
not subject to copyright liability, even if the works somehow
happened to be identical.88
But under patent law, independent inventors enjoy no such
liability shield. Even if Inventor B simultaneously develops an
invention that Inventor A happens to patent before Inventor B,
Inventor B in most cases will be subject to remedies under
patent law should inventor A elect to sue her. 89 Some view this
result as harsh, particularly because so much inventive activity
appears to be pursued simultaneously by multiple parties. 90
Several scholars thus argue that patent law, similar to
copyright law, would be well served adopting some form of an
independent invention defense to patent infringement. 91
The overarching concern in such proposals, however, is to
improve patent law's role in facilitating inventive activity. In
other words, the phenomenon of simultaneous invention by
multiple actors may suggest that weaker patent rights still
provide sufficient incentives to bring about the invention. And
one way to weaken patent rights and thereby address this
phenomenon is to adopt from copyright and trade secret law an
independent invention defense to an infringement claim. But
while this author and others believe that such intellectual
property borrowing is a good idea, it is not the hybridization
idea animating this Article.
The above examples are only a partial list of some recent
studies comparing and contrasting the different bodies of
intellectual property law.92 Such proposals may have much to
87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1426-28 (2009) (reviewing this approach under copyright
law). See generally 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012) (defining infringement).
88. See Cotropia & Lemley, supra note 87, at 1421-22.
89. Id.; see also ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW 275 (2d ed. 2004).
90. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709,
712-33 (2012) (reviewing various studies that suggest that simultaneous
invention by multiple parties is the norm rather than the exception).
91. Vermont, supra note 18; Asay, supra note 86.
92. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1069-71 (1997) (suggesting that copyright law may
become more efficient in facilitating improvements to copyrighted works by
adopting the concept of "blocking patents" that exists under patent law into the
copyright corpus); Irina Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303,
1346-54 (2012) (arguing that copyright law might be improved by adopting
certain tenets of trademark law when assessing copyright infringement claims);
Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case
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offer, and a comparative approach to intellectual property law
makes some sense given the common roots that the different
bodies of intellectual property law share in certain cases. 93 But
these proposals that draw in part on those common roots still
primarily seek to foster the distinct fruits of each body of
intellectual property law. That general approach makes sense
given how the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause has
traditionally been interpreted and translated into distinct
bodies of intellectual property law with discrete objectives. But
the objectives of patent and copyright law need not be viewed
in isolation and, indeed, are best realized by taking each other
into account.
2. Breaking Down the Dichotomy?
Some recent proposals have inched closer to bridging the
gap between patent and copyright laws. That is, some scholars
have pointed to the negative effects that copyright law has on
innovation, and have argued for a number of copyright law
reform measures aimed at ameliorating such effects.94 For
instance, some of these proposals stress the debilitating effects
of vagueness in copyright law.95 Accordingly, removing some of
this vagueness, or limiting copyright's more severe remedies
that copyright holders exploit on the basis of the law's
vagueness, would go a long way in addressing copyright law's
negative effects on innovation. 96
Other scholars have made similar arguments. For
instance, one recent study points out that different speech
distribution technologies receive disparate treatment under
copyright law and suggests that this disparate treatment slows
for a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOW. L.J. 579
(2005) (arguing that patent law would be well served by adopting some form of
compulsory licensing similar to what copyright currently includes).
93. See generally Oliar, supra note 8 (discussing the history and
interpretation of the Constitution's Intellectual Property clause).
94. See generally Carrier, supra note 16 (discussing how certain copyright law
decisions have negatively affected the pace and direction of technological
innovation); DiCola, supra note 19, (setting forth a number of proposed reforms to
copyright law that may help foster innovation).
95. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: Responses to
Marks, Masnick, and Picker, 2013 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 47, 57-58.
96. Id. at 57-59.
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innovation for such technologies. 97 It thus proposes equal
treatment for the various distribution technologies, so as to
avoid slowing innovation, and articulates an equality principle
based on both economic efficiency and First Amendment
principles relating to free speech.9 8
Another recent study argues that copyright law has
significant effects on the licensing, development, and use of
various technologies, and thus urges policy makers to consider
these effects in structuring copyright law reforms.9 9 Hence, one
implication of this argument is that copyright law should be
concerned with facilitating not only expressive activities, but
innovative ones as well.
Other scholarship manifests similar concerns.1 0 0 For
instance, on the basis of the negative effects that copyright law
may have on technological innovation, one recent proposal
argues in favor of modifying the fair use defense to copyright
infringement by incorporating more factors relevant to
technological innovation.10 1 This modified version of fair use,
titled "technological fair use," would enable copyright law to
respond more flexibly to innovative activities. 102 Others have
raised the issue of how fair use should be applied in technology
cases as well. 10 3
97. DiCola, supra 19, at 1845-77.
98. Id. at 1881-1902.
99. Peter DiCola & David Touve, Licensing in the Shadow of Copyright, 17
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 397 (2014).
100. Lee, supra note 16.
101. Id. at 832-55.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433,
438-41 (2008); Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1410-25
(2004) (proposing the use of a dispute resolution system to handle digital
copyright infringement, with a defense built in for arguable fair use); Joseph P.
Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571 (2008) (proposing to only
apply the first and fourth fair use factors to new digital technology cases);
Adrienne J. Marsh, Fair Use and New Technology: The Appropriate Standards to
Apply, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1984); Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer
Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of
Sony, Galoob and Sega, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 73-86 (1993); Pamela
Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2602-15 (2009)
[hereinafter Samuelson, Unbundling]; Sigmund Timberg, A Modernized Fair Use
Code for the Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 193
(1980); Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Advanced
Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450, 454-60 (1982).
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Courts have also explicitly acknowledged the interplay
between copyright law and innovation. For instance, in the
landmark U.S. Supreme Court Grokster case, the Court
addressed whether peer-to-peer software distributors could be
secondarily liable for copyright infringement on the basis of
users of the software infringing copyrighted materials.1 04 In its
analysis, the Court explicitly acknowledged "concern that
imposing liability, not only on infringers but on distributors of
software based on its potential for unlawful use, could limit
further development of beneficial technologies." 0 5
Yet none of these proposals argue that copyright law
should explicitly incorporate the traditionally distinct purposes
of patent law, and vice-versa.1 06 Instead, they propose
reforming copyright law in order to avoid impeding innovation,
and they do so on the general notion that innovation is a
positive thing that society should avoid hindering when
possible. 0 7 But copyright law, even under their proposals,
carries with it no authoritative mandate to actively foster
inventive innovation. And clearly articulating that authority
would change the approach from simply seeking to avoid
impeding innovation to a requirement under copyright law to
positively promote it. These scholars thus maintain the
traditional dichotomy between copyright and patent law while
arguing, essentially, against some of its negative effects.
The more straightforward approach, however, is to
recognize that inventive innovation is not the sole province of
patent law, nor is original expression the sole province of
copyright law. Instead, the two bodies of law and the purposes
that they are meant to promote are so intertwined that the
more appropriate solution is to explicitly reflect those realities
in the law itself.
Some of the proposals discussed above do point to First
Amendment free speech values as a constitutional basis
104. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
105. Id. at 929.
106. Lee, surpa note 16, at 820-22 (noting that his proposal has the advantage
of promoting the traditionally distinct purposes of patent law, but falling short of
arguing that copyright has a duty to do so). See also Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright
Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 53, 89 (2014) (indicating
that copyright law has long aimed to protect authors' rights without unduly
stifling technological innovation).
107. Greenberg, supra note 106.
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supporting their proposals. 0 8 In other words, much of the
innovation that copyright law purportedly impedes relates to
technologies that foster speech. Therefore, when copyright law
has such effects, Congress should change the law on the basis
of First Amendment values in order to better foster innovation
that supports speech.
Emphasizing the First Amendment in such efforts
certainly has merit. First Amendment free speech values are
deeply embedded in U.S. society and thus demand significant
deference when they are implicated in any legal issue. 109
Indeed, it may add yet another reason to pierce the traditional
dichotomy between patent and copyright law. But on its own,
the First Amendment may not be sufficient to jettison the
dichotomy, particularly where it is competing with another
constitutional provision-the Intellectual Property Clause-
and where not all technologies deserving of intellectual
property law hybridization may implicate First Amendment
values.
In sum, the clearer route to reforming copyright law in
order to better foster innovation lies in partially bridging the
traditional dichotomy between copyright law and patent law
and the purposes behind each. That is, copyright law should
not seek to simply avoid impeding innovation, but instead
should more expressly aim to foster it. And patent law should
seek to promote original expression as one of its primary
purposes. The next Part provides more detailed reasons in
support of such hybridization.
II. THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CREATIVITY AND
INVENTION
As Section II.A below will illustrate, mounting evidence
makes clear that creative activity significantly affects the pace
108. DiCola, supra note 19, at 1881-94; Lee, supra note 16, at 813-18.
109. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free
trade in ideas"); see also Terrance Sandalow, Opening Address: Equality and
Freedom of Speech, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 831, 831-32 (1995) (noting that the
"importance of the wide range of freedoms we now associate with the First
Amendment is so deeply embedded in the contemporary American psyche that
many forget that the establishment of those freedoms is almost entirely the work
of the twentieth century").
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and direction of innovation, and vice-versa. That one affects the
other is certainly not a new story.1 10 But that story has become
more compelling as new research has more closely examined
the relationship. Furthermore, related research examined in
Section II.B below suggests that separating creativity from
inventive activity may be a fool's errand given the
interdependent relationship between the two. All of this
suggests that the traditional attempt to strongly bifurcate the
two bodies of law meant to foster creativity and inventive
innovation-copyright and patent law, respectively-may be, in
important respects, misguided.
Indeed, other recent research, reviewed in Section II.C
below, argues that the historical interpretation of the
Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause that led to this
legislative and judicial bifurcation in the first place may have
been misinterpreted all along. In light of the interdependent
and inseparable realities of creative and innovative activities,
this new reading of the Intellectual Property Clause may well
be the better interpretation-or at least the one that best
supports the societal benefits that intellectual property law is
meant to provide, as Section II.D will argue.
A. The Interdependent Nature of Creativity and
Innovation
Several recent studies have examined the growing
interrelationship between creative and innovative activities.
For instance, one study examined the relationship in light of a
district court ruling holding that a peer-to-peer file-sharing
service, Napster, infringed copyright law.III In order to better
assess the effects that this ruling had on the pace and direction
of the technological innovation that the ruling implicated, the
study's author conducted extensive interviews after the
decision with technology company executives, leaders within
the recording industry, and the heads of venture capital
110. Randal C. Picker, Copyright and Technology: Dijd Vu All Over Again,
2013 WIS. L. REV. ONLINE 41 (indicating that the story of copyright affecting
innovation, and vice-versa, is old news).
11l. Carrier, supra note 16, at 901-05; see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster,
Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 900-01 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part and rev'd on other
grounds, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001).
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firms. 1 12 The study found a significant negative effect, meaning
that the ruling appeared to impede technological innovation. 113
Others contest these findings, asserting that the relationship
between innovation and creative output has been and remains
a productive one. 114 But regardless of with whom one agrees,
that a significant and growing relationship exists between
creative output and technological innovation is not in question.
Others have also recently written about the
interrelationship between creative and inventive activities and
the laws meant to support each. 115 One study notes, for
instance, that patent law has a long history of allowing for
"inventing around" patented inventions.11 6 The study finds that
a similar phenomenon is increasingly prevalent in the world of
copyright law, where technology companies innovate around
copyright law in an attempt to meet its demands.117 It goes on
to assess the possible benefits and detriments of this
phenomenon. 118 But implicit in this analysis is an
acknowledgement of the growing interplay between copyright
law, creative activity, and their effects on potentially
patentable innovations.
Copyright historians have also chronicled the dynamic
between creativity and innovation extensively."l 9 For instance,
copyright law has grown over time to encompass items that
were originally outside the explicit scope of copyright, such as
photographs, motion pictures, and sound recordings.1 20 Thus,
as technological innovation resulted in new types of content,
copyright law over time responded by incorporating them
within its ambit. 121 In other words, innovation and its effects
on creative activity and copyright law is a long-standing
phenomenon.
But in the digital world, where technological innovation
112. Carrier, supra note 16, at 893-95.
113. Id. at 908-14.
114. Steven M. Marks, Debunking the "Stifling Innovation" Myth: The Music
Business's Successful Transition to Digital, 2013 WiS. L. REV. ONLINE 21 (largely
contesting Carrier's findings).
115. Dan L. Burk, Inventing Around Copyright, 109 Nw. U. L. R. 547 (2015).
116. Id. at 551-55.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 555-60.
119. JESSIcA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 11-19 (2001).
120. Id. at 22-24, 106-07.
121. Id.
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has enabled more and more access to and creation of a variety
of different types of content, the interplay between
technological innovation and creative activity may be even
more pronounced, sometimes perhaps in deleterious ways. 122
Indeed, laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and
other related legislative proposals in recent years provide
evidence that, at least in the estimation of some, innovative
activities are putting increasing pressure on creative activities
and the law-copyright-that is meant to safeguard them.123
While parties dispute whether technological innovation
threatens or boosts creative activity, growing attention to the
dynamic carries with it an implicit acknowledgement that the
dynamic is increasingly prevalent and significant.
I have also recently written about the interdependencies
between creative and innovative activities. 124 In this previous
work, I point to a number of examples showing that creative
output spurs technological innovation, which in turn triggers
more creative output. 125 For instance, innovation in mobile
computing over the last decade has been significantly
motivated by a desire on the part of technology companies to
take advantage of the commercial possibilities associated with
copyrighted content. 126 The resulting technological innovations
in turn have helped spur a significant increase in the amount
and variety of content available. 127 Similarly, companies such
as Apple, Amazon, Google, Aereo, and Netflix have developed
technological products aimed at monetizing copyrighted
content, which in turn has facilitated the creation of and access
122. See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, What Federal Gun Control Can Teach Us About
the DMCA's Anti-Trafficking Provisions, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 649, 668-79 (laying
out the basics of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, an act meant to
help address growing copyright infringement in the digital age, and arguing
against many of its provisions as excessive). But see Mark A. Lemley, Is the Sky
Falling on the Content Industries?, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 125, 125-32
(2011) (arguing that technological innovation generally benefits the content
industries rather than harms them).
123. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, SOPA, PIPA, ACTA, TPP: An Alphabet Soup
of Innovation-Stifling Copyright Legislation and Agreements, 11 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 21 (2013) (detailing several recent copyright proposals that, in
Carrier's view, stifle innovation).
124. See, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Copyright's Technological Interdependencies, 18
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 189 (2015).
125. Id. at 195.




to such content, including in some cases these companies
actively subsidizing content development. 128
Hence, while the interdependencies between innovative
and creative activities are far from flawless, it becomes
increasingly difficult to deny their growing significance.1 29 And
on this basis, it makes some intuitive sense that the primary
bodies of law meant to facilitate creative and innovative
activities-copyright and patent law-should better take into
account and facilitate such interdependencies. In stark
contrast, however, copyright and patent laws appear fixated on
preserving the traditional divide between the two bodies of law.
B. The Inseparable Nature of Creativity and Innovation
The previous Section discussed how creative and
innovative activities often fuel each other and suggested, on
this basis, that copyright and patent law would do well to
better take into account these interdependencies through
intellectual property law hybridization. This Section reviews
another basis for such intellectual property law hybridization:
the often inseparable nature of creative and innovative
activities. In other words, if credibly distinguishing between
"creativity" and "invention" is near impossible in some cases, as
some of the research discussed below suggests, then both
copyright and patent law should better recognize that reality
through hybridization.
To illustrate: recent research suggests that the attempt to
divvy up creativity and inventive innovation into neat buckets
is often a difficult, if not impossible, task. 130 That is, where
copyrightable creativity ends and patentable innovation starts
is in some cases an arbitrary cutoff. This is so in part because
from a neurological, psychological, and cultural perspective, the
same creative processes that lead to copyrightable material
may underlie inventive activity as well. 131 Indeed, these line-
128. Id. at 205.
129. Id. at 212.
130. See Mandel, supra note 21, at 285-86. (reviewing psychological,
neurobiological, and cultural research that suggests that artists and inventors
both rely on the same creative faculties in producing new works, and arguing on
this basis that joint inventor and joint authorship laws under patent and
copyright law, respectively, should more be similar than they actually are).
131. Id.
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drawing difficulties become even clearer when attempting to
make such a delineation in certain domains, such as software.
As such, hybridizing patent and copyright law in order to
better reflect the porous natures of creativity and invention
may be justified in certain cases.
For instance, some scholars have examined the role that
creativity, as defined by modern psychological research, plays
in intellectual property law doctrine generally. 132 Some of these
studies point out that several requirements under both patent
and copyright law rely on creativity. 133 Patent law requires
that an invention be both novel and non-obvious in order to
qualify for patent protection. 134 The novelty requirement
generally means that the invention as a whole does not already
exist in the prior art, 135 while the non-obviousness requirement
means that the invention cannot be an obvious improvement or
change to something that already exists. 136 And under
copyright law, a new work must be "original"-or
independently created by the author with at least some amount
of creativity-in order to qualify for copyright protection. 137
Hence, under both bodies of law, some level of creativity is
required in order to satisfy independent requirements under
each. Indeed, another recent study reviews neurobiological,
psychological, and cultural research that suggests that the
same creative processes that result in copyrightable artistic
works underlie inventive activities as well. 138
Yet copyright and patent laws each impose uniform
creativity standards that fail to take into account this modern
132. See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual
Property Law and the Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999
(2011); Reuveni, supra note 21 (arguing that copyright law fails to take into
account modern neuroscience and psychology research on how creativity occurs
and suggesting how it may).
133. Mandel, supra note 132, at 2002-03, 2012-13.
134. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2012) (setting forth the novelty and non-
obviousness requirements under patent law).
135. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Point of Novelty, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1253
(2011) (discussing the novelty doctrine generally under 35 U.S.C. § 102).
136. See generally Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. & Christian T. Johnson, Not So
Obvious After All: Patent Law's Nonobviousness Requirement, KSR, and the Fear
of Hindsight Bias, 47 GA. L. REV. 41 (2012) (discussing the development of the
obviousness requirement under patent law generally).
137. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505,
1505-07 (2009).
138. Mandel, supra note 21, at 331-43.
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research, which provides key insights about the nature of
creativity and how it may differ depending on the context. 139 In
other words, creativity is often a multifaceted process that does
not fit neatly into the buckets that patent and copyright law
seek to place it. Hence, although copyright law may require a
form of "innovative creativity" in order to satisfy its mandates,
and patent law a form of "creative innovation," in fact neither
body of law adequately assesses and incorporates key new
insights from neurobiological, psychological, and cultural
research on creativity. 140
But the key point for purposes of this Article is that
creativity and inventiveness are so interfused and multifaceted
as to make cleanly separating them under either patent or
copyright law difficult. Invention requires creativity, and
creativity requires invention. 141 In some cases the bifurcation
between patent and copyright laws serves useful purposes. But
in others the arbitrary cutoff between copyrightable creativity
and patentable invention-and which rights thus attach to the
activity-may actually cause more harm than good.1 42
Hybridizing the bodies of law in order to better account for
these interdependent realities thus seems justified. And, as
discussed in Part III below, adjusting certain remedies and
defenses under each body of law is one promising way to avoid
imposing an artificial, and in some cases creativity- and
invention-inhibiting, simplicity on the multifaceted realities of
creativity and invention.
Other scholars have recently conducted studies that
support these insights in important respects. For instance,
several scholars have recently examined the differing creativity
139. Mandel, supra note 132, at 2007, 2012-13. But see DAN L. BURK & MARK
A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 167-70
(2009) (arguing that courts should treat different technology sectors differently in
terms of patent law in order to elide significant hindrances to innovation that the
current patent system causes).
140. See also Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 HARV. L.
REV. 1333, 1333-40 (2015) (pointing to psychological research that highlights
generative benefits of particular copyright law doctrines that others have often
discounted).
141. Mandel, supra note 21, at 331-43; Mandel, supra note 132, at 2006-07.
142. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 137 (proposing that copyright
law be altered in order to take into account the differing levels of creativity
required for various types of works, and thereby seeking to address some of the
possibly deleterious effects of copyright's low creativity threshold).
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thresholds required under both patent and copyright law before
something is deemed creative enough under each for legal
protection. 143 They seek, among other things, to assess in light
of four original experiments whether copyright and patent law
could be improved by adjusting their respective creativity
requirements.144 A starting point for their research, therefore,
is that both patent and copyright law require creativity, with
patent law generally imposing a more demanding creativity
standard than the relatively lax standards of copyright.1 45
These scholars also note that the types and amounts of
creativity required for different kinds of works, whether
traditionally protected under copyright or patent law, vary
significantly-and not always in the direction upon which each
body of law is premised.1 46 This view of creativity as
multifaceted and context-specific thus aligns with the previous
studies reviewed above in important respects, as well as the
arguments of this Article. 147 That is, even assuming that each
body of law in many cases requires the appropriate level of
creativity before rights are granted, in other cases it may not.
Thus, copyright and patent law may be both under- and over-
inclusive in their coverage. And that mis-calibrated coverage
may in some cases end up undermining the purposes of patent
law, copyright law, or both.
1. Backdoor Patents and Copyrights
Another way to think about this problem is to think of
creativity plotted out on a spectrum, where patent law sits at
the high end of the spectrum and copyright on the lower end
thereof. In addition to the concern that each body of law's
generality leads to over- and under-inclusiveness, other
significant implications arise. For instance, even assuming
patent law's higher threshold for creativity is generally
143. Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of Intellectual Property
Laws' Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014).
144. Id. at 1922-23.
145. Id. at 1921.
146. Id. at 1922. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of Intellectual
Property, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1456-83 (2010) (utilizing the psychology of
creativity to analyze the differences in protectability standards between patent
and copyright law).
147. See Mandel, supra note 132.
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justified, a patent grant may allow the patent holder to exclude
not only other inventive activity that is traditionally the
province of patent law, but also creativity that is traditionally
the province of copyright law.
For instance, if a party owns a patent on some software
invention, that party has the right to prevent third parties
from practicing the invention, including writing and using
otherwise copyrightable software code that implements the
invention. 148 This remains true even if the third party's
software code is otherwise quite different from the patent
holder's software code that implements the invention, and even
if the software includes greater amounts of creativity than the
patented invention. 149
Hence, while many have worried over the years about
patents granting excessive control in ways that harm other
would-be inventors, commentators seem to have been less
concerned about patent law's scope hindering copyright's
purposes. 150 And part of that lack of concern is likely
attributable to the traditional bifurcation between patent and
copyright law. But the tightly intertwined nature of creativity
and inventive activities suggests that in many cases this
bifurcation could be more damaging than previously thought.
In contrast, as discussed, commentators have worried over
the years about copyright law's impact on innovation. 151 This
creativity spectrum view of the world adds credence to those
concerns. After all, if owners of copyrighted materials are able
to assert copyright law in ways that inhibit higher levels of
creativity required for patent-eligible innovation (what some
have called "backdoor patents"), 152 then copyright law may in
some cases significantly impede the utilitarian purposes of
patent law.
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (setting forth the rights of patent holders).
149. Id. (making no exceptions to patent infringement on the basis of the
infringing work being copyrighted, regardless of how creative the work might be).
150. In fact, I have not been able to locate even a single major study whose
focus is to explicitly address patent law's potentially deleterious effects on the
purposes of copyright law.
151. See infra Part II.A.
152. See generally Moffat, supra note 59.
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2. Software as Bifurcation's Problem Child
A software example may help better illustrate some of
these concerns. Software is eligible for both copyright and
patent law protection. 153 Software thus earns copyright
protection even for minimal creative efforts, while also
potentially deserving patent protection when it meets patent
law's higher creativity threshold. Consequently, some piece of
software may obtain copyright protection, even though only
minimal creativity was required before it obtained this
protection. 154 Because of this, a third party wishing to use the
software in ways that require a greater amount of creativity
(i.e., the amount required under patent law) may be barred
from doing so. Naturally, the third party could simply seek a
license from the copyright owner, which may address this issue
in many cases. But holdout issues or an unreasonable licensor,
among other problems, may prevent that outcome. 155 And as a
result, society may suffer as it is deprived of the additional
innovative use of the software.
The utilitarian nature of software exacerbates these
concerns. That is, software is generally created with the aim of
enabling a computing device to run efficiently. 156 Its primary
aim, therefore, is to provide a utilitarian solution to some sort
of computing problem. Patent law has traditionally been
viewed as the appropriate body of law for encouraging and
protecting such utilitarian ideas. 157 Yet, because even
utilitarian ideas require some level of creativity to develop,
software qualifies for copyright protection as well. As a result,
courts have struggled to define exactly what is copyrightable
153. Grant C. Yang, The Continuing Debate of Software Patents and the Open
Source Movement, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 171, 192-202 (2005) (reviewing the
history of this dual protection).
154. John R. Ackermann, Toward Open Source Hardware, 34 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 183, 198-99 (2009) (discussing the low threshold for copyright protection).
155. Peter DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to
Copyright Policy, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 173, 178-79 (2012) (reviewing holdout and
other related problems in copyright licensing scenarios).
156. Robert Plotkin, Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention:
A Case for Software Patent Reform, 2003 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 7,
http://www.lawtechjournal.comlarticles/2003/07_040127_plotkin.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BHJ8-GC74] (providing an extensive definition and discussion of
what constitutes "software" and the purposes behind it).
157. See supra Section L.A for an extensive discussion of this point.
98 [Vol. 87
IP HYBRIDIZATION
and what is not in the utilitarian world of software.' 5 8 And that
uncertainty has almost undoubtedly in some cases inhibited
both copyrightable expression and patentable invention in
software development.1 59
Indeed, as mentioned above, copyright's low creativity
requirement also means that copyright holders of software
programs can in some cases use copyright as a cheaper, more
easily obtained proxy for patent rights, what some have called
backdoor patents.1 60 Even though rights under copyright are
generally weaker than those of patent, 161 they are nonetheless
sufficient to restrict access to the works in cases where that
result might impede, rather than foster, creative innovation. 162
When some software solution obtains patent protection,
similar concerns with creativity line-drawing and inhibition
arise. For instance, as briefly mentioned above, a patented
software invention may allow the patent holder to inhibit not
only other high-creativity patentable inventions, but low-
creativity copyrightable works as well. Indeed, the patent
holder is able to exclude others from practicing the software
invention, even in cases where the party has written their own
copyrightable software code that implements the invention;
that is, the patent holder's patent covers all copyrightable
works that implement the invention, not just their own.1 63 And
158. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Strange Odyssey of Software Interfaces
and Intellectual Property Law (Univ. Cal. Berkeley Public Ctr. for Law Research
& Tech., Paper No. 132381859, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1323818 [http://perma.cclMG87-5F4H] (tracing the evolution of
intellectual property law protection for software application programming
interfaces); Pamela Samuelson, Are APIs Patent or Copyright Subject Matter?,
PATENTLYO (May 12, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/05/copyright-
subject-matter.html [http://perma.cc/E44M-S5Z4] (reviewing some of the leading
cases that seek to address these problems).
159. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces Impeding
Interoperability?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1943, 2004-18 (2009) (suggesting that patent
protection for software interfaces has not had as deleterious effects as some have
suggested, but also arguing that some additional reforms would be worthwhile in
order to ensure that software development remains robust).
160. See Moffat, supra note 59, at 1523-24.
161. For instance, copyright law includes an independent creation defense to
copyright infringement, whereas patent law does not. See generally Vermont,
supra note 18, at 480-81.
162. See Moffat, supra note 59, at 1523-24.
163. Indeed, the rights granted under patent law do not take into consideration
whether the infringing party has a copyright interest in the allegedly infringing
work. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012) (setting forth the rights of patent holders).
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again, while parties may be able to obtain the appropriate
licenses from the patent holder, they may not be able to for a
variety of reasons. 164 For instance, their low-level creative
activities may not generate sufficient revenues to pay for the
necessary rights to practice the patented invention.
These concerns are even more troubling since some
patentable inventions may not actually require much
creativity. In other words, even if, in general and in the
abstract, patent law's creativity requirements are set high, it
can be the case that the amount of creativity required is low
and still sufficient to technically satisfy the patent statute. 165
This is a common complaint of many software patents, and
partially on this basis some have argued that patent law's
requirements should be heightened in the case of software
patents.1 66 Or, as others suggest, software patents should be
abolished altogether.1 67
3. Summary
In sum, much current research suggests that creative and
inventive processes are so multi-faceted and intertwined as to
render it difficult to easily categorize which levels of creativity
164. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty
Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007) (discussing the problem of patent holdup,
where the possibility of injunctive relief may unduly increase a patent holder's
bargaining leverage in licensing transactions).
165. For instance, accidental discoveries are no bar to patentability, in which
cases very little creative effort may have been exerted. See generally Sean B.
Seymore, Serendipity, 88 N.C. L. REV. 185 (2009) (reviewing the role that accident
plays under patent law).
166. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 139, at 158-59 (arguing that patents
related to software-implemented inventions should generally include heightened
disclosure requirements in order to help narrow their otherwise overly broad
scope); Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 905 (arguing that a primary problem with software patents is
that they are drafted to cover functions rather than the specific software
invention, and suggesting courts can correct this problem by limiting software
claims to the means described in the patent specification of implementing the
function).
167. See, e.g., Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against Patents, 27
J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 3-4 (2013), http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doilpdfplus/10.1257/
jep.27.1.3 [http://perma.cc/XD63-XDW7]; Vivek Wadhwa, Why We Need to Abolish
Software Patents, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 7, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/07/
why-we-need-to-abolish-software-patents/ [http://perma.cc/9ADM-NDK3]; END
SOFrWARE PATENTS, http://endsoftpatents.org/ [http://perma.cc/W2WH-BW4T].
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deserve what type of intellectual property law protection. The
software context discussed above highlights some of these
difficulties. This is not to say that copyright and patent law
should simply be fused as one body of law in a figurative
throwing up of the hands. But the research and examples
discussed above suggest that relaxing each body of law's
traditional rigidity in supporting its own set of goals is likely
justified. Indeed, given the often inseparable and
interdependent nature of creative and inventive activities, that
each body of law should more explicitly take into account those
realities seems only proper.
C. Constitutional Support of Hybridization
As discussed above in Section I.A, traditional accounts of
the Constitution's Intellectual Property Clause view it as the
basis for two different bodies of law with distinct purposes. And
as this Article has explored, Congress and the courts have
largely followed that reading of the Intellectual Property
Clause in implementing both copyright and patent law.
Yet recent research argues that the historical record may
not support this "disjunctive" reading of the Intellectual
Property Clause. 168 In his review of the available records from
the time of the Constitutional Convention, Dotan Oliar
concludes that the more reasonable interpretation of the
Intellectual Property Clause is to view the progress of both
"science" and the "useful arts" as the prerogative of both
copyright and patent law. 169 Indeed, state laws at the time of
the Constitution's adoption often incorporated this
understanding of the interplay between literature and
scientific discovery, upon which the Framers of the
Constitution almost undoubtedly relied in drafting the
Intellectual Property Clause. 170 It was thus probably
understood, as reflected in earlier state intellectual property
protections, that artistic and inventive activity were highly
interrelated.1 7 1 And if the Framers intended to depart from this
traditional understanding as reflected in the many state
168. See Oliar, supra note 8, at 463-74.
169. Id. at 471-74.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 474.
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constitutions at the time, one might expect more debate both at
the Convention as well as among the public on this score. But
such evidence is lacking in the available public records from
the time. 172
While based in Oliar's historical research, this
interpretation of the Intellectual Property Clause is also
justified in light of the modern-day realities of creative and
innovative activities discussed in Sections II.A and II.B above.
Indeed, if the Intellectual Property Clause is Congress's
primary means of facilitating creative innovation-and some
argue it is Congress's main permitted means under the
Constitutionl 73-then taking into account the often
interdependent, inseparable nature of creativity and invention
in implementing both copyright and patent law is not only
justified, but needed.
D. Theoretical Support of Hybridization
But will partially bridging the traditional divide between
copyright and patent laws result in each body of law becoming
less effective at what each is supposed to achieve? The
traditional theoretical view is that both copyright and patent
laws are justified as correctives to market failure. 174 That is,
intellectual products have the properties of public goods. They
are non-rivalrous, meaning one party's use of the product does
not diminish another's ability to use it.175 And they are non-
excludable, meaning that, without legal intervention, it is
difficult to exclude others from using the intellectual
product. 176 Because of these properties, traditional theory
postulates that, absent legal intervention, parties will not have
the right set of incentives to create intellectual products
because others can copy and use the products without incurring
172. Id.
173. Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual Property Clause's External
Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1342-43 (2012).
174. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (making this argument with
respect to copyright law); Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 129-30 (2004) (suggesting that
this rationale applies more broadly to intellectual property law in general).
175. ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY,




the same costs that the original developer did in creating
them. 177 And society suffers as a result.
Copyright and patent laws purportedly address these
concerns by granting to the works' creators exclusive rights in
them. With these rights, they are purportedly in a better
position to recoup the costs of their efforts in developing the
works.1 78 So if bridging the traditional divide between
copyright and patent law weakens these incentives to engage
in producing intellectual products, this may harm society
rather than benefit it. And adjusting both patent and copyright
law defenses and remedies in order to take into account the
purposes of the other may in some sense weaken remedies
under each, thus potentially reducing incentives to create
intellectual products under either body of law.
There are a number of responses to this concern. First, a
vast amount of literature has critiqued this traditional
utilitarian theory behind both copyright and patent law. For
instance, many commentators point to significant areas of
intellectual activity that have thrived in the absence of
intellectual property rights.1 79 Others offer substantial
evidence suggesting that, even in contexts where intellectual
property rights are available, those rights do not appear in
many cases to be the primary drivers behind the intellectual
activity in those spheres. 80 In many cases, competitive
pressures and other types of incentives appear to be the
triggers of intellectual activity. 181 In other words, the
utilitarian theory behind copyright and patent laws does not
177. Id. at 11-17.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., KAL RAUSTIALA & CHRISTOPHER SPRIGMAN, THE KNOCKOFF
ECONOMY: How IMITATION SPARKS INNOVATION (2012) (describing a variety of
industries that flourish in spite of a lack copyright protections, including sports,
fashion, and food); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating
Intellectual Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1437, 1444-47 (2010).
180. Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753 (2013)
(making this argument in the context of the free and open source software
movement); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98
VA. L. REV. 1745 (2012) (discussing the importance of a variety of non-pecuniary
incentives for intellectual activity).
181. Asay, supra note 180; Fromer, supra note 180. See also Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innovation, in ESSAYS IN
THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144 (1971) (discussing the incentives to innovate
that competitive markets provide).
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tell the whole story, even if it does provide a plausible
narrative in many cases. Consequently, though care should be
taken in making adjustments to copyright and patent laws,
these studies suggest that the traditional assumptions of
utilitarian theory may not deserve as much deference as they
have typically received.
Second, the proposals of this Article would not altogether
remove whatever incentives that copyrights and patents
provide. So to the extent that such incentives do spur
intellectual activity, they would arguably continue to play that
role in a world of intellectual property law hybridization. This
Article's proposals, if implemented, may alter these incentives
in some respects. But, as will be seen in Part III below, these
proposals are meant to be modest modifications to the existing
system rather than wholesale changes. In other words, as some
have argued, intellectual property law bifurcation does serve
some useful purposes. 182 But when it does not, the
hybridization for which this Article argues would facilitate the
interdependencies between creative and inventive activities.
Indeed, implementing this Article's proposals would
arguably create additional incentives for intellectual activity
that help offset whatever weakening of incentives that may
occur. That is, if parties knew that patent law's current
indifference to copyrightable creative activity were relaxed,
they may be more likely to engage in such creative activity. A
software programmer, for instance, might be more likely to
undertake a highly creative (and copyrightable) software
endeavor, despite the possibility of patent infringement, if that
software programmer knew that patent law grants some
deference to copyrightable creative activities.
Or, if parties engaging in inventive activity knew
beforehand that copyright law grants some deference under its
fair use doctrine to inventive activities to the extent that they
prove novel and non-obvious, those parties would have greater
incentives to pursue those inventions (or at least more clarity).
For instance, if a technology developer hoping to develop an
182. Fromer, supra note 146, at 1483 (arguing that the differing originality
requirements under each of copyright and patent law accord with the
psychological literature on creativity); Lee, supra note 16, at 820-22 (discussing
the importance of preventing copyright from covering functional elements of
works that are properly the domain of patent law, if any).
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innovative, socially beneficial way of delivering copyrightable
content to users knew that copyright law explicitly took into
account the innovation's novelty and non-obviousness, that
technologist might be emboldened to pursue the innovation.
In other words, the interdependent realities of creative and
innovative activities mean that adjusting defenses and
remedies under both copyright and patent law in order to
better adapt to those realities may actually bolster incentives,
overall, rather than weaken them. This bolstering, in turn,
may lend greater credence to the predominant utilitarian
theory behind each of copyright and patent law so long as each
is properly calibrated to the other. The next Part turns to
fleshing out the proposed mechanics of intellectual property
law hybridization and applying such hybridization to several
actual legal disputes.
III. IMPLEMENTING HYBRIDIZATION
As discussed in Part I, several commentators have
proposed measures that, if implemented, would help bring
about some amount of intellectual property law harmonization.
However, such proposals typically lack a clear theory as to why
they deserve implementation, other than to suggest that their
implementation may help avoid impeding innovation and First
Amendment values. For instance, these accounts fall short of
providing strong reasons why copyright law should be
concerned with goals that traditionally have been the
prerogative of patent law. And this lack of coherence may
explain why little if any work has been done in suggesting that
patent law should seek to foster copyrightable expression when
possible.
Part II above has sought to provide a more coherent theory
and basis behind intellectual property law hybridization. It
points to empirical, neurological, psychological, cultural, and
constitutional law research done by this author and others that
suggests that the interdependent, inseparable nature of
creative and inventive activities is not only fait accompli, but
one which the Intellectual Property Clause of the U.S.
Constitution may have originally assumed.
With these supports in place, this Part now assesses (1) a
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"technological fair use" proposal in the copyright sphere, 183 and
(2) a proposal relating to reforming patent law remedies. 184 In
light of Part II's conclusions, Sections III.A and III.C below
suggest several significant modifications to these proposals in
order to better hybridize each of copyright and patent law.
Sections III.B and III.D then apply the adapted proposals to
two significant recent legal disputes.
A. Technological Fair Use Revisited
1. Introduction
As noted earlier, copyright law's fair use defense is an
important exception to copyright infringement.1 85 The defense
privileges certain uses of a copyrighted work-such as a parody
or using the work for purposes of criticism-despite those uses
technically infringing another party's copyright.1 86 Courts
determine whether a use is fair by taking into account four
statutory factors, as well as certain policy rationales. 187
Because technological innovations enable more and more
potentially beneficial uses of copyrighted works in ways that
infringe copyrights absent a fair use defense, several scholars
have proposed some form of technological fair use in the
past.1 88 But subsequent court decisions appear to have given
little heed to such proposals. 189
This Article argues that some form of technological fair use
has not been explicitly adopted, despite the relatively frequent
calls for it, in part because of the traditional bifurcation
between copyright and patent law and the distinct purposes
behind each. In other words, courts have assessed cases that
implicate both creativity and innovation through whatever
conceptual lens-either copyright or patent law-they felt
required to apply. Thus, so long as the traditional dichotomy
183. See Lee, supra note 16.
184. See Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation,
61 AM. U. L. REV. 733 (2012).
185. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
186. Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 103, 2539-42.
187. Id. at 2543-44.
188. Lee, supra note 16, at 803-04 (describing the work of Paul Goldstein and
Pamela Samuelson on this issue).
189. Id. at 801.
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between copyright and patent laws remains intact, the
restrained manner in which courts assess problems involving
both innovation and creativity is likely to remain intact as well.
But if courts felt emboldened-indeed, authorized under
the Constitutional basis for both bodies of law-to take into
account the purposes behind patent law when assessing
copyright law questions, and vice-versa, then their analyses of
such questions would almost certainly look different. Indeed, as
this Section III.A will argue, the same conclusion holds true
with respect to a recent technological fair use proposal.
2. Technological Fair Use Basics
The most recent call for some form of technological fair use
focuses on information technologies-particularly what Edward
Lee, the author of this proposal, calls speech technologies (e.g.,
peer-to-peer software).1 90 Lee argues that copyright law can
impede technological innovation in these areas when applied
too rigidly.1 91 He points out that the fair use defense includes
no factors that explicitly take into account technological
innovation. 192 And this is so despite the fact that the legally
permitted intersection of copyright law and speech technologies
is often a question of fair use. 193 He argues on the basis of a
synthesis of existing case law, economic theory, the First
Amendment, and the Intellectual Property Clause that the
defense of fair use should explicitly take into account factors
relating to technological innovation. 194
Lee's proposal leans heavily on a creation/operation/output
spectrum that he articulates. 195 The creation end of the
spectrum involves using a copyrighted work in order to create a
technology.1 96 The operation stage covers using a copyrighted
work in order to operate a technology, but not producing it as
an output of the technology.1 97 The output stage, which is at
the opposite end of the spectrum from the creation stage,
190. Id. at 798 n.1.
191. Id. at 802.
192. Id. at 805-06.
193. Id. at 801.
194. Id. at 811-12.
195. Id. at 842-45.
196. Id. at 842-43.
197. Id. at 843-44.
2016] 107
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
covers these latter scenarios.1 98 Examples of output uses of
technology include using a photocopier to produce a copy of a
copyrighted work, or transmitting content over radio or
television technologies. 199
According to Lee, if the accused technology makes use of
the copyrighted work at either the creation stage or in
operating the technology, such uses generally weigh in favor of
fair use.200 At the output stage, a finding of technological fair
use becomes less likely because the technology produces the
copyrighted work as an output and thereby enables uses that
in many cases replace or supersede the copyrighted work's
typical uses (e.g., photocopying a copyrighted work). 20 1
Lee also argues that courts should take into account the
technology's possible positive effects on the potential market
for the copyrighted work.202 He (along with others) 203 notes
that many technologies that initially were viewed as the death
knells of the content industries have actually in many cases
become their de facto saviors.204 Hence, though earlier in his
analysis Lee cautions against courts employing cost-benefit
analyses of emerging technologies, he suggests that if courts
can perceive some public benefit of the technology, particularly
one that enhances the copyrighted works' markets, then such
considerations should weigh in favor of a finding of
technological fair use.205
Finally, Lee also recommends considering the effects of an
adverse ruling on the market for the speech technology. 206 He
argues taking this into account is justified based on both First
Amendment values and the need to prevent copyright law from
exerting a patent-like effect in controlling the development of
emerging speech technologies. 207
198. Id. at 844-45.
199. Id. at 844.
200. Id. at 842.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 853-54.
203. See generally Lemley, supra note 122, at 128-29 (discussing, for instance,
how introduction of the VCR actually ultimately boosted profits for creators of
motion pictures).
204. Lee, supra note 16, at 853-54.





3. An Analysis of Lee's Proposal
Lee's proposal has much to recommend it. It offers a
serious attempt to provide courts with a framework for
adjudicating these complex cases. And the guideposts that it
provides make a great deal of sense, particularly when taking
into account First Amendment values. Furthermore, his
synthesis of previous case law dealing with these issues
provides some needed clarity around case outcomes that
otherwise may appear to have little in common. 208
Yet, the analysis falls short, in part, because of its
theoretical underpinnings. For instance, Lee's focus on speech
technologies is telling; this focus is in some respects necessary
because of his theoretical reliance on the First Amendment and
its values in coming to his conclusions. 209 In other words,
without the First Amendment backing up his claims, Lee's
analysis may lack the theoretical support that he needs in
order to justify his conclusions. Although he does point to
economic efficiency and the Intellectual Property Clause in
support of his arguments, 210 the fact that Lee largely confines
his analytical construct to speech technologies suggests that
those other factors, at least in Lee's mind, may be insufficient
to carry the day.2 11
But other technologies outside of speech technologies may
also merit technological fair use consideration. Indeed, as will
be discussed below, the software industry is replete with
situations where an infringement and fair use analysis should
take into account considerations relevant to both the
underlying copyrighted work and the technology making use of
the work.212 Yet Lee's framework may not adequately cover
such scenarios, given that they do not explicitly have to do with
speech technologies. In other words, the theory that Lee
articulates in support of his framework-which leans heavily
on First Amendment values 2 13-may not lead to the best
208. See id. at 805-11.
209. See id. at 813-18.
210. See id. at 818-20, 822-32.
211. Lee does not explicitly limit his construct to speech technologies, but much
of his analysis focuses on them, and he occasionally seems to explicitly limit
himself to them when discussing the fair use factors.
212. See infra Section III.B.
213. See Lee, supra note 16, at 813-18.
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outcomes in scenarios where First Amendment considerations
are not implicated, even if technically his framework could be
applied to such cases.
Relatedly, Lee's creationloperation/output spectrum also
poses problems. For instance, while Lee cautions against
formulaic precision, 214 his construct may nonetheless lead
courts to rule against technological fair use in most cases
where a copyrighted work is being used as an output. Indeed,
despite his caution against rigid application of his construct,
that is, in essence, Lee's recommendation. But again, this
recommendation is largely driven by the types of technologies
with which Lee is concerned: speech technologies, or
technologies whose purpose is to relay to users some form of
speech, such as a copyrighted work.
While this spectrum may make some sense with respect to
speech technologies, it may make less sense when applying it to
technologies that produce copyrighted works as outputs, but
are not speech technologies themselves. Software's use of other
copyrighted software works as outputs is one such example.
And as will be discussed below, such uses may be some of the
more innovative uses in the world. 215 Thus, relying too heavily
on the First Amendment in these scenarios may mean that
some of the technologies most deserving of strong technological
fair use consideration do not receive it.
Lee does suggest that courts should assess the likely
impact on a technology of an adverse fair use ruling.216 Doing
so may help mitigate some of the above concerns. But again, he
largely justifies taking this into account based on the First
Amendment and helping maintain what he perceives as
appropriate boundaries between patent and copyright law.217
But as this Article argues, a more coherent way of
approaching copyright cases that implicate technological
innovation is to consider the goals of both copyright
(encouraging production of original works of authorship) and
patent law (encouraging production of inventive ideas) in such
assessments. Doing so avoids neglecting certain technologies
214. See id. at 833 (noting that it is unrealistic to expect that his proposal will
yield "outcomes like a mathematical formula").
215. See infra Section JI.B.




simply because they do not implicate First Amendment values.
The First Amendment may add even more weight to scenarios
that implicate it. But other scenarios, as discussed below, are
also deserving of strong consideration. 218 And Part II above
provides empirical and theoretical support in favor of such
intellectual property law hybridization.
4. A Modified Technological Fair Use Proposal
So how should courts conduct fair use inquiries in cases
where technological innovation and use of copyrighted works
collide? The short answer, described in greater detail below, is
that courts could hybridize copyright's fair use analysis by
taking into account, as part of that analysis, patent law
principles and the purposes behind them. Doing so allows
copyright law to respond more flexibly and purposefully in
scenarios that implicate both creative and inventive activities.
It should be made clear at the outset that this proposal is
not meant to displace the more traditional fair use approach
entirely. In some cases involving both innovation and creative
works, the traditional fair use approach may already yield a
finding of fair use solely on the basis of copyright law and the
purposes behind it.219 Such results should not be disturbed, as
they are the product of copyright's own carefully selected
internal limitations.
But in cases where fair use is not found under the
traditional inquiry, the technological fair use approach, as
articulated in this Section III.A.4, should apply in order to
improve copyright law's capacity to promote patent law's
purposes, without undermining its own. In other words,
technological fair use is a second level of inquiry to the more
traditional fair use approach that is meant to better calibrate
copyright law to the interdependent realities of many creative
and inventive activities.
Traditionally, a fair use inquiry involves assessing four
non-exhaustive statutory factors: (1) the purpose and character
of the use, (2) the nature of the copyrighted work, (3) the
amount of the copyrighted work used, and (4) the use's effect on
218. See infra Section III.B.
219. See Lee, supra note 16, at 806-13 (discussing technological cases where a
traditional fair use analysis has resulted in a finding of fair use).
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the market for or value of the copyrighted work. 220 Courts often
give most weight to the purpose and character of the use
factor-i.e., whether the use is "transformative" or not-as well
as the use's effect on the market for or value of the copyrighted
work. 221 But no one factor is dispositive. 222  The following
sections discuss how each of these factors should be
implemented when a technological fair use case is at hand.
a. Factor One-Whether the Use Is
"Transformative"
In assessing the first fair use factor-whether the use of
the copyrighted work is "transformative" or not-courts should
look to the Patent Act. Under the Patent Act, inventions must
be both "novel" and "non-obvious" in order to qualify for patent
protection.223 Novelty generally means that the invention does
not already exist in the prior art in a single reference. 224 Non-
obviousness stipulates that a patented invention cannot be an
obvious improvement upon, change to, or combination of things
already in the prior art.225 In making this non-obviousness
assessment, the U.S. Patent Office and courts assess the prior
art and compare it to the patent's claimed invention. 226 They
may also take into account secondary considerations such as
commercial success, long-felt but unsolved need, and the
220. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
221. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43, § 13.05[A][4] (stating that the
fourth factor often "emerges as the most important, and indeed, central" factor in
fair use cases (citations omitted)); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 579 (1994) ("[Tjhe more transformative the new work, the less will be the
significance of other factors . . . ."); Joel L. Hecker, The Wave of the Future or
Blatant Copyright Infringement?, N.Y. ST. B.J., May 2007, at 44, 45 (indicating
that courts have traditionally given the most weight in a fair use analysis to the
first and fourth factors).
222. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-78 (1994) (indicating that no one factor is
dispositive); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448
(1984) (same).
223. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012) (setting forth patent law's novelty
requirement); 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (setting forth patent law's non-obviousness
requirement).
224. See generally Lemley, supra note 135, at 1253-54.
225. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012) (requiring non-obviousness). See generally
Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit's New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An
Empirical Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709 (2013) (discussing courts'
interpretations of what non-obviousness means).
226. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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failure of others to successfully develop the invention. 227 If
present, such factors may provide some indication that the
invention was not actually obvious in light of what others had
previously done, since otherwise the invention would not have
experienced the commercial success and acclaim that it did.
These novelty and non-obviousness standards are both
threshold questions for patentability. 228 They are in place in
order to ensure that only truly inventive things receive patent
protection.2 29 Hence, they provide some reasonable guidance as
to what types of innovations Congress believes are actually
worth protecting.
Likewise, in assessing the first fair use factor in a
technological fair use case, courts should assess novelty and
non-obviousness. Courts would do so not in order to grant a
patent to the innovator, but instead to assess whether the
innovation is actually transformative and thus worth
protecting. Hence, if the innovation making use of the
copyrighted work is both novel and non-obvious, such findings
should weigh in favor of a finding that the technology is
"transformative" and thus in favor of a finding of technological
fair use.
There are at least two advantages to using these novelty
and non-obviousness proxies in a technological fair use case.
First, courts have some experience making such assessments
and can rely on case law to provide additional guidance to their
efforts. Second, innovation that does meet the novelty and non-
obviousness bars is precisely the type of innovation deserving
of protection. That is, if some innovation lacks novelty or is
obvious in light of what others have done, fewer reasons may
exist to grant it deference in balancing rights between
copyright owners and technology innovators. But in cases of
innovations that do meet these requirements, there is good
reason to grant such innovations greater deference since they
represent innovations that are hard to come by and which, on
average, may provide greater societal value. Hence, while
avoiding application of copyright law in ways that harm
227. Id. at 18.
228. Indeed, as earlier indicated, a patent may not be granted in the absence of
one of these requirements being met. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.
229. Lemley, supra note 135, at 1254 (making this point with respect to the
novelty requirement); Rantanen, supra note 225, at 714-22 (discussing the theory
and purpose behind the non-obviousness requirement).
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innovation is a valid concern that others have raised time and
time again,230 using these proxies helps ensure that the
innovations that we avoid hindering are the types that deserve
these extra safeguards.
Of course, using these proxies also poses challenges. If
some party actually does patent their innovation (or part
thereof) that makes use of some copyrighted work, does that
mean that the party can then automatically avail itself of
technological fair use in using the copyrighted material? The
answer is clearly no. Any fair use analysis requires a balancing
of all the relevant factors.231 While the first factor is important,
it is not dispositive. 232
Relatedly, in assessing these proxies, courts should look at
the innovation as a whole, rather than its individual
components that, on their own, may be patentable. Looking at
the innovation as a whole helps avoid overemphasizing the
importance of some innovative component of the larger
innovation in ways that may unjustifiably tip the scale in the
innovator's favor. After all, it should be the overall technology's
use of the copyrighted material that courts are assessing in
terms of transformativeness, not individual components
thereof. Courts should thus be wary of conflating issues by
overemphasizing innovative aspects of the technology that do
not actually use the copyrighted work in an innovative or
transformative way.
For complex technologies, using the novelty and non-
obviousness standards as patent law currently applies them
may present additional challenges. Complex technologies, such
as smartphones or other computing products, typically
implicate thousands of patentable inventions. The Android
software operating system, for instance, includes over 10
million lines of software code. 23 3 Given the complexity of these
technologies, it may be asking too much of courts to expect
them to be capable of assessing whether such technological
230. See, e.g., infra Section I.B.2.
231. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing a non-exhaustive list of relevant factors
that courts are to consider).
232. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994)
(indicating that no one factor is dispositive).





innovations are novel or non-obvious in accordance with
specialized patent law. 234
However, relying on patent law's secondary considerations
for non-obviousness--commercial success, long-felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, and unexpected results-may
be a better approach in such cases and more within a court's
grasp. And to some extent using these weaker proxies makes
good sense given the goal at hand, which is to grant under
copyright law increased protections to innovative technologies,
but not to grant them the stronger set of rights that come with
a patent.
Of course, the commercial success of an innovation should
undergo careful assessment as part of a technological fair use
case. After all, there are many factors affecting commercial
success other than whether the product is a new or non-obvious
improvement upon what has come before. Indeed, commercial
success may result in part precisely because the technology
facilitates copyright infringement. 235 Nonetheless, significant
adoption of the technology in the face of others' repeated
failures to deliver the same technology provides some evidence
that the technology is worth protecting.
It should also be stressed that if a court making a
determination of technological fair use were to conclude that a
patented technology either lacked novelty or was obvious in
light of the prior art, such a holding would only relate to the
technological fair use analysis, not the validity of the patent.
And since the validity of the patent was not before the court, its
analysis of novelty and/or non-obviousness would not be
binding in any way on future courts considering whether the
same patent were valid, though other courts may find its
analysis persuasive. Indeed, this may be another benefit of this
Article's conception of technological fair use-intellectual
property law hybridization may yield certain judicial
efficiencies in later cases.
234. See, e.g., Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2120 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusing to join part of the majority's
opinion discussing science because it is, in his opinion, beyond his level of
expertise).
235. Part of the reason YouTube, for instance, was initially popular is precisely
because it allowed greater access to copyrighted works.
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b. Factor Two-Nature of the Copyrighted Work
The second factor of a fair use analysis concerns "the
nature of the copyrighted work." 23 6 In his proposal, Lee
concludes that this factor has less weight in the technological
fair use context than in the run-of-the-mill fair use case.237
This is so because assessing the copyrighted work's level of
creativity is a poor proxy, according to Lee, in determining
whether the technological use thereof should be permitted.238
For instance, determining whether using a VCR to time-shift
TV programs is fair use on the basis of whether the underlying
TV program is mostly a factual work or a highly creative one
makes little sense.239
But this factor deserves more weight in light of this
Article's findings, at least in cases that are not already deemed
fair uses under a more traditional approach. If creativity and
innovative activity are often inseparable, interdependent
realities, as argued in Part II above, then the creativity
spectrum discussed therein has implications for assessing this
factor. For instance, if a copyrighted work is the result of a
highly creative effort, then this should weigh against a finding
of technological fair use in cases not already resolved under a
more traditional fair use approach. And this may even be the
case where the technology in question is deemed in some sense
transformative, as measured under patent law.
For example, some technology making use of a copyrighted
work may satisfy the novelty and non-obviousness
requirements, yet barely so. That is, it may represent a fairly
modest innovation, such as a slight improvement in mobile
battery efficiency resulting from incorporation of some
copyrighted software. In contrast, the copyrighted software
being used as part of this innovation may include an elegant
and highly creative combination of algorithms that constitutes
an ingenious effort. Thus, the balance may tip against a finding
of technological fair use because, when comparing the
technology to the copyrighted work, the copyrighted work
represents a much higher degree of creativity and innovation
236. 17 U.S.C. § 107.





than the technology. Indeed, a finding of technological fair use
may dampen incentives for parties to pursue such highly
creative efforts.
Of course, conducting such comparisons poses significant
challenges. How to objectively compare the levels of creativity
and innovation involved in producing the copyrighted work and
technology, respectively, is certainly not a perfect science, nor
will it ever be. And courts may, in some cases, be ill-equipped
to overcome such challenges.
Yet others have already articulated models for calibrating
the rights and liabilities of authors based on the level of
creativity involved in producing the copyrighted work. 240 This
is not to say that these models are without challenges. But it is
to say that such challenges are not without possible solutions.
Indeed, fair use today is a highly fact-intensive evidentiary
analysis.241 Under this proposal that general approach would
not change, even if the specific elements under consideration
within the fair use factors would.
c. Factor Three-Amount of the Copyrighted
Work Used
The third factor of a fair use analysis takes into
consideration the "amount and substantiality" of the
copyrighted work used.24 2 Generally, the more of the work that
is used, the less likely a finding of fair use becomes unless the
amount used is "reasonable in relation to the purpose of the
copying." 243 In his proposal, Lee layers this approach with his
creation/operation/output spectrum. 244 The result is that, in
Lee's view, using more of the copyrighted work is justified at
the first two stages but less justified when the copyrighted
work is used as an output of the technology.245
But again, the creativity spectrum discussed in Part II
comes into play in assessing this factor as well. If a use is
240. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 137, at 1509.
241. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577-78 (1994); see also
17 U.S.C. § 107 (containing a non-exhaustive list of factors that courts are to
consider); Samuelson, Unbundling, supra note 103, at 2540.
242. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
243. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
244. Lee, supra note 16, at 842-45.
245. Id. at 842-44.
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highly transformative from a technological standpoint, that
may weigh in favor of technological fair use, even if the entire
copyrighted work is used. This may be especially so if the level
of creativity involved in creating the copyrighted work-Factor
Two-is low relative to that of the technology.
Conversely, if the technology in question includes only
minimal levels of creative innovation, then that technology's
use of some copyrightable material may not be justified, even
in cases where only small amounts of the copyrighted work are
used. This may be particularly so where the copyrighted work
represents a highly creative effort.
d. Factor Four-Effect on the Market
Factor Four-the effect of the use on the potential market
or value of the copyrighted work-has traditionally been one of
the more important factors in the fair-use balancing act.246 And
it would remain so under this Article's conception of
technological fair use. But this Article's findings regarding the
interdependent, inseparable nature of creativity and
innovation have implications for this factor as well.
Indeed, like under Lee's proposal,247 courts, in assessing
this factor, should take into account the potential market
impact not only on the copyrighted work, but on the technology
as well. This becomes even more imperative if the technological
innovation is highly transformative-and thus highly valuable
to society-relative to the copyrighted work. Blatant,
superseding uses of the copyrighted work in conjunction with
the highly innovative technology should not be permitted. But
ones that fall outside of the traditional market opportunities of
the authors-precisely because of the transformative,
innovative uses that the technology enables-should be.
5. Summary
Commentators for some time have worried about the
effects that copyright law, when applied too rigidly, can have
on innovative technologies. 248 To that end, several scholars,
246. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43, § 13.05[A][4].
247. Lee, supra note 16, at 854.
248. See generally Section I.B.2.
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including Edward Lee, have advocated for a modified version of
copyright's fair use defense that is geared towards protecting
innovative efforts. 249 However, such proposals have typically
leaned heavily on the First Amendment as their primary
theoretical justification for changing copyright law in this
way.250 And that reliance shapes their proposals in ways that
may not best serve technological innovation in all cases.
The question then becomes: if the concern is to better
protect innovation, why not look to the body of law that
Congress has enacted to promote it? This Article suggests that
the traditional bifurcation between patent and copyright law is
largely to blame for proposals failing to rely more heavily on
principles within patent law in balancing interests between
copyrightable expression and technological innovation.
The preceding sections have sought to partially bridge this
divide by providing a more coherent way of addressing
scenarios that implicate both creative expression and invention
in the fair use context. And in so doing, the proposal relies on
Part II of this Article and its review of empirical and
theoretical reasons why this traditional divide is often
unjustified. The next Section applies this modified proposal to a
legal dispute between Oracle and Google that implicates a
significant intersection between creative and inventive
activities.
B. Google's Java Problem251
Google's Android software has become the world's most
popular software platform for mobile devices, including
smartphones, tablets, gaming consoles, and others. 252 Google
licenses Android under a variety of permissive open source
software licenses that make it accessible to parties other than
just Google. 253 Android thus powers devices from a variety of
249. Lee, supra note 16, at 813-18.
250. See generally Section I.B.2.
251. Portions of this section are adapted from Asay, supra note 124.
252. Steven Levy, New Android Boss Finally Reveals Plans for World's Most
Popular Mobile OS, WIRED (May 13, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.wired.com/
2013/05/exclusive-sundar-pichai-reveals-his-plans-for-android/ [https://perma.cc/
DF3N-AGMG].
253. Licenses, ANDROID, https://source.android.com/sourcellicenses.html
[https://perma.cclFGW3-KPJQ].
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companies, including Samsung, Amazon, Motorola, and many
others.254 As of November 11, 2013, Android was used on forty-
three percent of the world's smartphones, making it by far the
most popular mobile software platform in the world.2 55
Part of Android's ubiquity stems from its incorporation of
Java application programming interfaces ("APIs").256 Sun
Microsystems originally developed the Java APIs; Oracle
Corporation subsequently acquired Sun Microsystems and thus
ownership of the Java APIs. 257 Sun developed the APIs to help
programmers solve a ubiquitous problem of having to create a
new version of a software program for every different
technology platform in order for the program to operate
properly on each. 258 The Java APIs helped solve this problem
by enabling software developers to create programs once that
could then operate on any number of different technological
platforms.259
When building Android, Google elected to copy many
aspects of the Java APIs into the Android ecosystem. 260 Google
did so largely because programmers were already familiar with
many of the functionalities that the Java APIs permitted.26 1
Thus, Google decided to incorporate many of the same
functionalities into Android so that programmers would have
254. Levy, supra note 252; Lisa Mahapatra, Android Vs. iOS: What's the Most
Popular Mobile Operating System in Your Country?, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Nov. 11,
2013, 3:22 PM EST), http://www.ibtimes.com/android-vs-ios-whats-most-popular-
mobile-operating-system-your-country-1464892 [http://perma.cc/9MLY-ZLTB].
255. Mahapatra, supra note 254.
256. Daniel Eran Dilger, Google Fighting to Suppress Evidence Android
Willfully Infringed upon Oracle's Java, APPLEINSIDER (Aug. 6, 2011, 5:00 PM),
http://appleinsider.com/articles/11/08/06/google-fightingto-suppress-evidence-an
droidwillfully-infringedupon.oracles.java.html [http://perma.cc/C8DZ-MP7Q]
(discussing internal emails at Google, which revealed that Google had evaluated
alternative platforms to Java and deemed that all of these alternatives "sucked"
in comparison).
257. Larry Dignan, Oracle Buys Sun; Now Owns Java; Becomes a Hardware
Player, ZDNET (Apr. 20, 2009, 4:44 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/blogfbtiloracle-
buys-sun-now-owns-java-becomes-a-hardware-player/16598 [http://perma.cc/7WW
2-DTKH].
258. See generally History of the JavaTM Programming Language, WIKIBOOKS,
http://en.wikibooks.org/wikilJavaProgramming/History [http://perma.cc/7RWA-
2A42] (last modified June 2, 2015).
259. Id.
260. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012)




an easier time working with and adopting Android. 262
Overall, Google copied the basic structure, sequence, and
organization of thirty-seven specific Java APIs into the Android
platform.263 In some cases Google also copied from the Java
APIs single words or short lines of software source code. 264
Google copied this "declaring code" into Android because,
without doing so, the pertinent Java API would not work as
intended.265 Google also copied entire files of source code in
several instances. 266 But in nearly all other cases, Google
created its own "implementing code," or the software that
actually carries out the functions specified by the declaring
code within the Java APIs. 267
1. Oracle v. Google
Oracle ultimately brought copyright infringement claims
against Google on the basis of its use of the Java APIs within
Android. 268 Google answered the complaint in part by arguing
that the APIs were not subject to copyright and, even if they
were, Google's use of them constituted fair use.269
In a highly anticipated decision, the district court found
that the basic structure, sequence, and organization of the
APIs were not copyrightable because they were a system or
method of operation,270 which the Copyright Act expressly
excludes from copyright protection. 271 The district court also
found that copying the declaring code did not constitute
copyright infringement because the merger and short phrase
doctrines barred copyright for that specific code.2 72
Oracle appealed the district court's decision to the Court of
262. Id.
263. Id.




268. The original suit also included patent infringement claims. See Oracle
Sues Google over Android, REUTERS (Aug. 13, 2010, 2:23 AM), http://www.reuters.
com/article/2010/08/13/us-google-oracle-android-lawsuit-idUKTRE67B5G7201008
13 [http://perma.cclCD9S-S3E6]. But Oracle ultimately lost on the patent claims.
Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
269. Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 976.
270. Id. at 976-77.
271. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012).
272. Oracle, 872 F. Supp. 2d at 998.
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit reversed
the district court on nearly every important point. First, it held
that the declaring code is subject to copyright because Oracle
had infinite options as to the selection and arrangement of the
thousands of lines of software that Google, in the cumulative,
had copied. 273 Furthermore, the court held that the short
phrase doctrine does not bar copyright in this instance because
the 7,000 lines of declaring code that Google had copied should
be viewed in the cumulative rather than as individual lines or
words. 274
The Federal Circuit also concluded that the general
structure, sequence, and organization of the Java APIs was
subject to copyright. 275 The Federal Circuit found that the
district court failed to follow binding Ninth Circuit precedent-
which, according to the Federal Circuit, holds that copyright
can protect the expression of a process or method-and instead
followed precedent from another circuit. 276 Furthermore, even
the precedent upon which the district court relied was
distinguishable from the facts in the present case, at least
according to the Federal Circuit. 277 The Federal Circuit thus
concluded that, because Oracle employed creative choices in
expressing the ideas underlying the Java APIs, that original
work was subject to copyright protection, despite whatever
functional considerations they entailed.278
On the fair use question, the Federal Circuit remanded the
case for a new trial on the issue.279 Although in its review of
the fair use factors the court seemed to side with Oracle's
position that Google's use of the APIs was not fair use, the
court concluded that enough material facts were still in dispute
that it could not decide the issue as a matter of law.280
273. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
274. Id. at 1362-63.
275. Id. at 1348.
276. Id. at 1365-68.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1367.
279. Id. at 1348.
280. Id. at 1376-77.
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2. Assessing Technological Fair Use
The Federal Circuit's landmark decision has spawned
significant controversy in the technology industry. Some
suggest the decision could prove disastrous, 28 1 while others
believe the court came to exactly the correct conclusions.282
Google, of course, has a number of options. Because its petition
to the Supreme Court for certiorari was recently denied,283
Google can either request an en banc review of the decision
with the Federal Circuit284 or simply undertake a new trial to
determine whether Google's use of the Java APIs constitutes
fair use.
Hence, if Google chooses not to seek en banc review with
the Federal Circuit, then a new trial on the fair use question
would occur. Based on the Federal Circuit's opinion, Google's
chances to prevail on that issue may appear unpromising. But
arguments that take into account the factors outlined above
relating to technological fair use make Google's case appear
much stronger.
281. Russell Brandom, Federal Court Overturns Google v. Oracle Decision,
Setting Disastrous Precedent, VERGE (May 9, 2014, 1:53 PM),
http://www.theverge.com/2014/5/9/5699958/federal-court-overturns-google-v-oracle
[http://perma.cc/YEQ3-A32T]; Corynne McSherry, Dangerous Decision in Oracle v.
Google: Federal Circuit Reverses Sensible Lower Court Ruling on APIs,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (May 9, 2014), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/
05/dangerous-ruling-oracle-v-google-federal-circuit-reverses-sensible-lower-court
[https://perma.cclX8Q4-UECJ]; David Pollak, Oracle v. Google, A Mitigated
Disaster, DZONE (May 11, 2014), http://java.dzone.com/articles/oracle-v-google-
mitigated [http://perma.cc/S6N9-MHHV].
282. Florian Mueller, Oracle Wins Android-Java Copyright Appeal: API Code
Copyrightable, New Trial on Fair Use, FOSS PAT. (May 9, 2014), http://www.foss
patents.com/2014/05/oracle-wins-android-java-copyright.html [http://perma.cc/
S4CF-639X] (largely applauding the ruling); The Sky Is NOT Falling: Oracle v.
Google Decision is Good for Software, SCHNEIDER ROTHMAN INTELL. PROP. L.
GROUP, PLLC (May 10, 2014), http://www.sriplaw.com/sky-falling-oracle-v-google-
decision-good-softwarel [http://perma.ce/RS6L-QLBT] [hereinafter The Sky Is
NOT Falling].
283. Lawrence Hurley & Dan Levine, U.S. Top Court Declines to Hear Google
Appeal in Oracle Java Fight, REUTERS (June 29, 2015, 11:49 AM EDT),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/06/29/us-usa-court-google-idUSKCNOP91072
0150629 [http://perma.cc/AHR9-D8GF].
284. Mueller, supra note 282 (suggesting that a full-court review would
probably not change the outcome).
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a. Factor One
On the first factor-the purpose and character of the use,
including whether the use is for commercial or nonprofit
purposes285-Google can make a case that what it has done
with the Java APIs surpasses anything that Oracle has been
able to achieve with them. Oracle has never implemented the
Java APIs as part of a successful smartphone software
platform, despite repeated efforts to do so.286 Google has, while
also completely rewriting the implementing software code for
the platform and augmenting the thirty-seven Java APIs with
hundreds more of its own.287
Google will face challenges in winning this point, since in
some nominal sense it has simply used the APIs in the manner
for which they were originally intended-that is, as APIs. But
Google has arguably put them into a completely different
context and transformed the smartphone and mobile
computing industry by so doing.288 Thus, though the use is
certainly commercial in nature, if a court accepts the view that
the use of the APIs is highly transformative, the commercial
aspect alone should not prove dispositive.
Indeed, judging Android's incorporation of the APIs from
the perspective of patent law may help solidify this conclusion.
Is Google's use of the APIs novel and non-obvious in light of the
Patent Act's standards? Frequent patent assertions against
Android users from the likes of Microsoft, Apple, and others
may suggest that Android is simply a pirated version of ideas
285. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
286. Larry Dignan, Google: Oracle, Sun Blew It on a Java Smartphone, CNET
(Apr. 18, 2012, 5:46 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/google-oracle-sun-blew-it-on-
a-java-smartphone/ [http://perma.cc/EXU5-LGH9].
287. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978-79 (N.D. Cal.
2012), aff'd in part, rev'd in part 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
288. See Glenn Chapman, Analysts Say Google Is 'Just Trying Harder' Than
Apple, and Android Innovation Is Racing Ahead, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 18, 2012,
5:31 PM), http://www.businessinsider.comlandroid-innovation-is-faster-than-
apple-2012-11 [http://perma.cc/2FKR-PRBT ] (suggesting that Android innovation
has outpaced the competition since its introduction in 2008); Anton Wahlman,
Apple Desperately Copies Google's 2008 Features but Passes on Innovation,
STREET (June 6, 2014, 5:25 PM EDT), http://www.thestreet.
com/story/12730613/1/apple-desperately-copies-googles-2008-features-but-passes-
on-innovation.html [http://perma.cc/7WHV-7JPA] (suggesting that, in 2014,
Apple's most recent improvements to its iPhones simply mimic innovations that
Google introduced with Android at its inception).
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that have been around for some time.289 But many of those
assertions relate to narrower pieces of Android rather than the
overall operating system and its incorporation of the APIs.290
Indeed, some of the most prominent patent suits brought
against Android-based phones concern design patents, not
utility patents.291
But what of the fact that Google has not historically
obtained significant numbers of patents on Android? 292 This
alone does not indicate that Android's overall system of APIs
was not novel or non-obvious at some point. Instead, it may
mean that Google simply failed to pursue patents on the
operating system because of its "openly" licensed nature.293
Because of Android's complexity-the entire platform
consists of over ten million lines of software code2 94 -it may
make the most sense to assess Android's innovativeness in
light of the non-obviousness inquiry's secondary considerations.
In Android's case, the technology has been incredibly
commercially successful and, as mentioned, Oracle has failed to
successfully implement the APIs as part of a smartphone
289. See, e.g., Jason Kincaid, Apple Sues Samsung, Claims Its Android Devices
Are Copycats, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 18, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011O04/18/
apple-sues-samsung-claims-its-android-devices-are-copycats/ [http://perma.cc/
JPS5-JHRL]; Joe Mullin, Android Makers Must Pay Microsoft, or Else-Software
Giant Sues Samsung, ARSTECHNICA (Aug. 1, 2014, 3:55 PM MDT),
http://arstechnica.com/apple/2014/08/android-makers-must-pay-microsoft-or-else-
software-giant-sues-samsung [http://perma.cc/43XK-T8WZ].
290. Florian Mueller, Apple Does Not 'Own' Multitouch Smartphones and
Tablets Any More than Samsung 'Owns' Phablets, FOSS PAT. (Apr. 3, 2014),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2014/04/apple-does-not-own-multitouch.html
[http://perma.cc/96ET-H43X] (detailing some of Apple's failed attempts to assert
patents against Samsung's Android-based phones on the basis of particular
smartphone features).
291. Bret Swanson, Apple v. Samsung Highlights Unfinished Work in the
Patent Reformation, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2014, 11:28 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/bretswanson/2014/09/02/apple-v-samsung-highlights-unfinished-work-in-the-
patent-reformation/ [http://perma.cc/N44D-BSDU] (discussing the role of design
patents in a patent dispute between Apple and Samsung).
292. Antonio Regalado, Google's Growing Patent Stockpile, MIT TECH. REV.
(Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/521946/googles-growing-
patent-stockpile [http://perma.cc/2QE8-RMRF] (reviewing Google's failure to
acquire patents on Android historically and its more recent attempts to acquire
patents in order to better protect Android).
293. The Android mobile platform is licensed under a number of permissive
licensing terms that essentially allow any third party to use it without paying
licensing fees. Licenses, supra note 253.
294. Lee, supra note 233.
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platform despite repeated efforts to do so.2 95 So at least two of
the so-called secondary considerations seem to have been
squarely met.
Of course, much of this commercial success may be traced
to Android's permissive licensing terms.2 96 But other
permissively licensed platforms have failed to gain the same
level of commercial traction. 29 7 So factors other than
permissive licensing terms-including Google's significant
engineering efforts-likely have a great deal to do with
Android's success. Indeed, by some accounts Android has
largely powered innovation in the smartphone market since its
introduction in 2008.298
As mentioned, however, others claim that Android's
success is largely a result of it copying others' patented
inventions. 2 99 Largely on this basis, Steve Jobs declared
"patent thermonuclear war" against Google before he passed
away. 300 But again, Apple's patent assertions have to do with
more discrete pieces of technology rather than with the overall
Android platform and its system of APIs. 30 1
It is not possible in this Article to provide a conclusive
answer as to whether Android's use of Java APIs in building
295. Dignan, supra note 286.
296. See Ryan Paul, Why Google Chose the Apache Software License over
GPLv2 for Android, ARSTECHNICA (Nov. 6, 2007, 8:26 AM MST),
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2007/1 1/why-google-chose-the-apache-
software-license-over-gplv2/ [http://perma.ccl85FT-AWBY] (discussing Android's
permissive licensing scheme and its advantages).
297. See, e.g., Adrian Covert, HP's Open Source WebOS Code Has Arrived. Will
Anyone Actually Use It? GIZMODO (Aug. 31, 2012, 1:31 PM),
http://gizmodo.com/5939670/hps-open-source-webos-code-has-arrived-will-anyone-
actually-use-it# [http://perma.cclY3ER-V6JB] (discussing the release of WebOS, a
mobile operating system, under an open source licensing scheme, and expressing
skepticism that the technology will succeed); Chris Welch, HP Is Killing All
Remaining Palm WebOS Devices on January 15th, VERGE (Oct. 16, 2014, 12:06
PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/16/6988395/hp-killing-all-webos-support-
january-15 [http://perma.ccV4HN-PFZG] (confirming the failure of WebOS to
take off two years later).
298. Chapman, supra note 288 (suggesting that Android innovation has
outpaced the competition since its introduction in 2008); Wahlman, supra note
288 (suggesting that, in 2014, Apple's most recent improvements to its iPhones
simply mimic innovations that Google introduced with Android at its inception).
299. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
300. Scott Cleland, What Really Made Steve Jobs So Angry at Google, GIZMODO
(Sept. 10, 2012, 7:26 AM), http://gizmodo.com/5941817/what-really-made-steve-
jobs-so-angry-about-google [http://perma.cc/78N4-8UW9].
301. Mueller, supra note 290; Swanson, supra note 291.
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the Android ecosystem is "transformative" or not as measured
in part under patent law principles. Some evidence, as provided
above, suggests an answer in the affirmative. But because the
standards that the court applied were different from those
articulated in this Article, a full litigation, where all relevant
evidence could be produced, would be necessary to provide a
more complete assessment thereof. But one of the main points
of this Article is to advocate that in considering such evidence,
courts should take into account more explicitly the purposes
and principles of patent law in scenarios that implicate both
copyrighted content and technological innovation. Such an
approach recommends itself particularly in situations where a
traditional fair use approach, which confines itself to copyright
goals, yields a negative fair use finding in part because it
simply ignores the goals of innovation law.
b. Factor Two
On the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, 302 some of the Federal Circuit's reasoning would seem to
align with this Article's findings. For instance, the Federal
Circuit's finding that the basic structure, sequence, and
organization of the thirty-seven APIs, as well as the thousands
of lines of declaring code, were copyrightable because they
involved significant creative choices in some respects aligns
with this Article's basic conclusion that both original
expression and inventive activity implicate creativity.303 That
is, simply because some form of technology is by nature
utilitarian-which is the case with software-does not mean
that creativity was absent in its production. In fact, the
opposite conclusion is more reasonable in light of this Article's
analysis in Section II.B above.
The question then becomes, when assessing this factor, the
level of creativity involved in producing the APIs. By some
accounts, including the Federal Circuit decision, creating the
API system was a significant creative effort. 304 This may tend
to militate against a finding of fair use. But if the technology
using the copyrighted APIs is highly transformative, which on
302. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2012).
303. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
304. Id.; The Sky Is NOT Falling, supra note 282.
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first blush Android's incorporation of the APIs into a mobile
computing environment appears to be, then the first factor may
neutralize the relative importance of this factor weighing in
favor of Oracle.
c. Factor Three
On the third factor of the technological fair use analysis-
the amount of the copyrighted work used 305-some of the
analysis depends on how courts frame the issue. For instance,
Google only used thirty-seven of hundreds of available Java
APIs.306 But viewing the issue from a different angle, if each of
the APIs is viewed as a separate work, then Google copied
thirty-seven separate works in their entirety. Of course, this is
not how the Federal Circuit viewed the APIs-it viewed them
cumulatively, including the declaring code, in coming to the
conclusion that the work included significant expressive
choice. 307 Overall, then, Google seemed to only use the number
of Java APIs that it deemed essential for software developers
accustomed to using Java.
Hence, though the Java APIs took significant creative
efforts to produce, it is important not to conflate the creative
effort relating to the entire Java ecosystem with that of
creating the pieces thereof that Google actually used.
Thousands of lines of software code may sound significant. But
when compared to Android's over ten million lines of software
code, 308 or even the entire Java ecosystem, 309 the respective
creative efforts needed for each gain some needed perspective.
Indeed, particularly if Android's incorporation of limited
portions of Java is considered transformative, then the
relatively small amount that Google used may weigh in
Google's favor in terms of technological fair use.
305. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2015).
306. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
aff'd in part, rev'd in part 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
307. See Oracle, 750 F.3d at 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
308. Lee, supra note 233.
309. Oracle and Java, ORACLE, https://www.oracle.comljava/index.html





The final factor-the use's effect on the market for or value
of the copyrighted work310-may be the most difficult obstacle
to Google winning a technological fair use argument. Before
Oracle acquired Sun, the company had a long history of
licensing the APIs; 311 indeed, licensing APIs is not uncommon
in the world of technology. 312 Of course, it seems questionable
to foreclose a finding of fair use simply because a party is
willing to license assets and others are willing to pay for them,
though some courts have engaged in such circular reasoning, as
discussed above.313
Indeed, risk-averse parties may regularly pay for things
that the law may not actually require of them. 314 A prominent
engineer at Google, for instance, notoriously indicated in the
run-up to the Oracle v. Google decision that he was under the
impression that the company would need to license the APIs
from Sun Microsystems. 315 And Google in fact engaged in
extensive negotiations with Sun Microsystems to license the
310. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).
311. Dan Farber, Former Sun CEO Says Google's Android Didn't Need License
for Java APIs, CNET (Apr. 26, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/
former-sun-ceo-says-googles-android-didnt-need-license-for-java-apis/ [http://
perma.cc/EX47-7RKU] (discussing parts of this history).
312. Indeed, companies subject use of their APIs to licensing conditions all the
time. See, e.g., API Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, https://instagram.comlabout/legall
terms/apil [https://perma.cc/H7Q7-4H27] (setting forth Instagram's API license
terms); API Terms of Use, LINKEDIN, https://developer.linkedin.com/legallapi-
terms-of-use [https://perma.cc/5RHP-SBA2] (setting forth Linkedln' API license
terms).
313. See Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 927-32 (2d Cir.
1994) (rejecting Texaco's fair use argument, largely on the basis that copying
individual journal articles hurt the licensing market for the individual articles
even though, at the time, the market was not well-developed).
314. See generally James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in
Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007) (arguing that risk aversion
may generally lead to an expansion of intellectual property rights, or at least how
parties and courts perceive the scope of intellectual property rights in determining
whether parties must pay for access to goods and services purportedly covered by
those rights).
315. Brandon Bailey, Larry Page Evasive with Oracle's Lawyer, but Admits
Google Never Obtained Java License, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Apr. 18, 2012,
9:55 AM PDT), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci 20424638/google-oracle-trial-
larry-page-admits-android-java-licence [http://perma.cc/GXL7-8MMA] (detailing
some of the history of the negotiations between the two sides).
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APIs, though the two parties never reached a deal.3 16
While all of this may seem damning for Google's case, the
question nonetheless remains how Google's use of the APIs
impacted Oracle's market for them. Oracle clearly lost some
revenues from the lost licensing opportunity to Google. But
Oracle has never developed a successful smartphone/tablet
software platform using its Java APIs, nor successfully licensed
anyone else to do so. 3 17 So Google's use of the APIs in such a
platform does not appear to undercut any additional revenues
that Oracle expected or is currently expecting.3 18
Oracle is naturally free to continue to try to license the
technology to third parties for use within a mobile operating
system. But the company still has not done so and does not
appear poised to. 3 19 So preventing Google from using the APIs,
on the mere supposition that Oracle may eventually do so, or
may eventually successfully license someone else to do so,
seems like the wrong result. Indeed, as discussed above, this
fair use factor should also take into account the likely market
impact on the technological product, particularly if it is a
transformative one with high societal value. In the case of
Android, these conditions seem clearly met.
In fact, in some respects Google's use of the Java APIs may
actually enhance Oracle's market for the Java APIs in general.
Because Google incorporated the APIs into its own platform,
software developers that use Java now need not switch APIs.32 0
While Google's use of the APIs may not be the only factor in
encouraging developers to continue to use Java, it may be a
significant one. Android's incorporation of Java APIs may thus
actually bolster Java as an industry standard. And in the
future, this may mean that third parties are more likely to use
316. Id.
317. Dignan, supra note 286 (discussing Oracle's failure to develop a
smartphone platform using its APIs).
318. See generally id.
319. In fact, Oracle claims that one of the primary reasons that the company is
not poised to do so is because Google fragmented Java with Android's success,
thereby thwarting Oracle's ability to develop its own successful platform. See
Opening Brief and Addendum of Plaintiff-Appellant at 27-28, Oracle Am., Inc. v.
Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (No. 13-1021, 13-1022), 2013 WL
518611, at *27-28.
320. Farber, supra note 311 (discussing Java adoption generally as one of the
reasons that Sun, the previous owner, may have given Google a free pass on using
the company's APIs despite the lack of a license).
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Oracle's Java-related products for other purposes for which
Oracle actually has technological solutions.
3. Summary
In sum, when applying technological fair use as developed
in this Article, Google's chances of success appear more
promising than what the Federal Circuit decision may imply. 32 1
It is impossible to detail here all the relevant evidence that
may come out during a trial on the matter. But based on what
is known, there is room for optimism.
This more optimistic view of Google's chances is largely the
product of partially bridging the typical divide between
copyright and patent law and taking into account the goals and
principles behind each when adjudicating cases that implicate
both copyrightable original expression and patentable
technological innovation. And as argued in Part II, this
conceptual move seems warranted. The next Section examines
a proposal to reform patent law remedies and suggests
additional changes to this proposal in light of this Article's
arguments in favor of intellectual property law hybridization.
It then examines a series of patent law cases that implicate
copyrightable expression and applies the next Section's
modified proposal to those cases.
C. Reforming Patent Law Remedies
Patent law remedies have been a significant source of
scholarly discussion in recent years, particularly in light of the
U.S. Supreme Court's eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
decision.3 22 In that case, the Court assessed the standards for
determining what types of patent law remedies-injunctive
relief or money damages-were appropriate in cases of patent
infringement. 32 3 The legal dispute in question concerned a non-
practicing entity or "patent troll"-a patent owner that does
not produce products or services but sues others that do-that
321. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
322. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
323. Id. at 390-91.
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had sued eBay for patent infringement. 324 Hence, some of the
Court's analysis deals either explicitly or implicitly with this
growing phenomenon. 325
In its holding, the Court overruled the Federal Circuit's
presumption that injunctive relief applies in cases of patent
infringement absent exceptional circumstances. 326 It instead
held that courts should apply a more flexible four-factor test to
determine whether a permanent injunction is appropriate in
any given case. 327 Those four factors consist of assessing 1)
whether the patent holder will suffer irreparable injury, 2)
whether money damages are inadequate, 3) balancing of the
harms to the parties, and 4) the public interest. 32 8
In formulating this standard, the Court clearly indicated
that it was not creating categories of entities that should be
automatically denied injunctive relief.329 Nonetheless, some of
the case's commentary-particularly that coming from Justice
Kennedy's concurrence-has been interpreted to mean that
patent trolls generally should not be entitled to injunctive
relief. Indeed, district courts have largely implemented this
interpretation of the Court's standards in denying patent trolls
injunctive relief in the majority of cases since the eBay
decision. 330
And such a trend makes some sense. After all, if patent
trolls are largely after money, not market share, then granting
them money damages seems sufficient; they will not suffer
"irreparable damage" without the injunctive relief remedy. The
harm of granting injunctive relief against the party producing
products and services, on the other hand, may typically
outweigh whatever harm the patent troll suffers with a denial
of injunctive relief-if in fact they are unjustly suffering any at
all.33 1
Indeed, categorically denying patent trolls injunctive relief
324. Id. at 391-93.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 394.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 391.
329. Id. at 393-94.
330. See, e.g., Rajec, supra note 184, at 751-58 (reviewing this trend).
331. For example, denying a patent troll injunctive relief while granting
monetary damages would seem to satisfy both parties. The patent troll would
receive its monetary compensation, while the infringing party would be able to
continue to produce the relevant products and services.
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may also help address the concern that, with injunctive relief
at their disposal, patent trolls are able to extract higher fees
from infringers than may otherwise be justified. But from the
opposite perspective, the lack of injunctive relief may also
mean that they are unable to obtain appropriate returns on the
basis of their patents' value.
Commentators have offered a variety of viewpoints and
proposals relating to the eBay decision and its aftermath in
district courts. Section III.C.1 below assesses one such proposal
from Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec that urges courts to alter their
calculus in determining what patent law remedies are
appropriate in any given situation.332 Section III.C.2 then
suggests how Rajec's proposal should be further modified in
light of this Article's findings.
1. Tailoring Remedies to Spur Innovation
As the title and substance of Rajec's article make clear, her
purpose in advocating reform of patent law remedy standards
is to enhance innovative activity under the patent system.333
To that end, Rajec takes issue with the emerging rule followed
by district courts in the wake of the eBay case. 334 This rule has
generally meant that patent holders that can demonstrate they
have lost market share as a result of patent infringement can
obtain injunctive relief, while those that do not cannot. 335
Rajec concludes that market share is an imperfect proxy
for innovative activity because it is both over- and under-
inclusive. 336 She argues that some business models that
currently contribute the most to innovation actually lack
market share. 337 And the rule is under-inclusive because many
companies with high levels of market share sometimes have
incentives not to further innovate on their existing inventions,
instead using their patents to simply bludgeon the
competition. 338 Yet the market share rule does not take these
types of incentives into account in determining appropriate
332. Rajec, supra note 184, at 773-83.
333. Id. at 734-35.
334. Id. at 736-38, 758-73.
335. Id. at 736, 758-59.
336. Id. at 738, 759, 759 n.126.
337. Id. at 737, 764-73.
338. Id.
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types of patent remedies. 339
Rajec suggests that a better standard would lay more
stress on the public interest factor of the four-part injunctive
relief inquiry, which she indicates is typically recited pro forma
under the assumption that granting injunctive relief serves the
public interest by remedying patent infringement.34 0 Rajec
argues that courts should use the public interest factor to more
explicitly evaluate the potential effects of permanent
injunctions on the incentives to innovate and to provide access
to that innovation, which the market share rule systematically
neglects. 34 1 She does not advocate completely abandoning
market share as a consideration-indeed, she suggests it
should remain a significant consideration. 342 But, in Rajec's
view, that consideration should be embedded within a broader
public interest analysis that better takes into account the likely
effects of a permanent injunction on encouraging both
innovation and access to innovative products. 34 3
2. An Analysis
Rajec's proposal makes valid points. Commentators have
often struggled to differentiate between patent trolls that
impede innovation and other non-practicing entities that may
actually facilitate it.344 Thus, relying on market share to
determine whether injunctive relief is appropriate is almost
certainly over-inclusive, as Rajec argues. 345 And the inertia
that sometimes plagues larger companies with significant
market share 346 may mean that entitling them to injunctive
relief in a patent dispute can give them excessive leverage,
thereby working to stop innovative start-ups in their tracks.
Rajec's reliance on the previously under-utilized public interest
factor may help make the injunctive relief standards that
339. Id. at 771-73.
340. Id. at 773-83.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 774-75.
343. Id. at 774-83.
344. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for
the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2126-29 (2013) (discussing the different
types of non-practicing entities and the costs that each may impose on
innovation).
345. Rajec, supra note 184, at 759.
346. Id. at 768-69.
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courts employ even more flexible in effectively responding to
innovative environments.
But Rajec's proposal does not address the effects that
patent law remedies can have on creative activities outside the
patent realm. Indeed, as mentioned, her article is explicitly
about adjusting patent law in order to make it better at
achieving its traditional purposes. 34 7 But as this Article has
argued, patent law's purposes should also include those
traditionally assigned to copyright law.
Hence, the public interest factor for which Rajec
advocates 348 ideally would also take into account the public's
interest in having access to materials traditionally within the
purview of copyright. If granting injunctive relief in a patent
dispute would limit access to such creative works, then courts
should take into account such a consideration as part of the
overall calculus.
It is certainly true that a variety of technologies commonly
have downstream effects on copyrightable creative efforts.34 9 So
denying injunctive relief to parties with patents on such
technologies, simply because their technologies facilitate access
to or creation of copyrightable content, is the wrong result. For
instance, it would make little sense to automatically deny
injunctive relief to a patent holder on some streaming
technology simply because granting injunctive relief would
mean that viewers of streamed content would be impacted.
It may make more sense to deny injunctive relief, however,
if the patented technology is a fairly modest innovation
compared to the significant public benefit of the copyrightable
works. This may be even more true if the patent holder is
adequately compensated through monetary damages. In other
words, this Article does not argue that the presence of
copyrightable activities downstream from the patented
technology should dictate the injunctive relief question. But it
does argue that those activities should help inform the answer
347. Id. at 734-35.
348. Id. at 773-83.
349. To take just one example, the development of Apple's GarageBand
technology has enabled many amateur artists to produce creative musical works
that, without the technology, they may have had difficulty doing. See A Brief




UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
to that question as part of the public interest factor.
3. Summary
While much has been written about copyright law's
potentially deleterious effects on technological innovation,350
less frequent are analyses of how patent law might interfere
with the purposes related to copyright. This relative neglect
likely results in part from the traditional divide between patent
and copyright law and the purposes behind each. Indeed, even
in those analyses that focus on copyright law impeding
technological innovation, the traditional divide is alive and
well, as discussed above in Section I.B.2.
But patent law can and does have effects on copyrightable
creative activities. It should, therefore, take these effects into
account given the interdependent, often inseparable nature of
creativity and innovation. The next Section explores a recent
patent dispute relating to podcasts and applies the reformed
proposal discussed above to that dispute.
D. Patenting Podcasts
In early 2013 a company called "Personal Audio" began
suing prominent podcasters, including Adam Carolla, for
patent infringement. 35 1 The company had previously asserted
patents against the likes of Apple for creating playlists within
its products. 35 2 In the case of Adam Carolla and the other
podcasters, Personal Audio claimed that the act of producing a
podcast violated one of its patented technologies. 353
Personal Audio is a prototypical non-practicing entity, also
known as a patent troll.354 Often such an entity relies on the
high cost of patent litigation to force alleged infringers to settle
350. See generally supra Section I.B.2.
351. Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Says It Owns Podcasting; Sues Adam Carolla,










with it for some monetary amount. 355 Indeed, because of the
high costs of patent litigation, alleged infringers often take this
settlement route, even in cases where they believe that either
they do not infringe the asserted patent or that it is invalid.356
In the case of the podcasters, however, Carolla and others
initially responded with defiance.357 Carolla began raising
money from his listeners to defend himself against Personal
Audio.358 Personal Audio eventually offered to dismiss its
patent suits once it discovered through the litigation process
that podcasters, on the whole, make very little money.359 But
for a time, Carolla refused these entreaties and continued to
raise money in order to help eventually invalidate Personal
Audio's patents.360 The parties did ultimately settle, with the
terms of the settlement mostly confidential. 361
The podcaster suits are a good example of where patent
rights may interrupt creative activity that is typically the sole
prerogative of copyright law. That is, remedies under patent
law, including with Rajec's reformed proposal, typically do not
take into account their potential impact on such creative
activities, at least in any sort of explicit way. And this result
stems in part from the traditionally strict bifurcation between
copyright and patent laws and the purposes behind each.
But it makes good sense for patent law in some cases to
explicitly take into account its potential effects on undermining
or facilitating the purposes behind copyright law, too. In the
case of the podcaster suits, then, an assessment of the
appropriateness of injunctive relief should take into account
the likely effects on copyrightable creative activity as well.
Hence, courts should not look solely to the market-share
rule or even Rajec's broader version of the four-part inquiry; in
both cases, despite different implementations, the inquiry is
still focused on improving patent law's ability to meet the
355. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 344, at 2126.
356. Id.
357. Daniel Nazer, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Adam Carolla's
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objectives of patent law-properly incentivizing the production
of inventive ideas. Instead, the four-part inquiry in assessing
the appropriateness of injunctive relief could be broadened to
take into account the potential effects on copyrightable creative
activities. And the most logical place for this effect to be
considered is under the public interest factor of the four-part
inquiry.
In the case of the podcasters, would this broader inquiry
have made a difference? After all, Carolla and Personal Audio
did eventually settle.362 Indeed, the costs of defending suits
through trial and a determination of remedies remain
significant enough to deter that route, even with a test that
incorporates additional considerations that may ultimately
result in a denial of injunctive relief. And both the current
market-share rule and Rajec's reformed proposal were probably
sufficient to deny Personal Audio injunctive relief.
Nonetheless, altering patent law remedies generally so as
to include considerations that typically belong within the realm
of copyright still has salience. The U.S. Supreme Court, for
instance, was clear in its eBay decision that it was not creating
a rule that non-practicing entities are not eligible for injunctive
relief, even if district courts subsequent to the decision have
largely made this the standard for now. 363 In the case of the
Personal Audio-podcaster disputes, therefore, taking into
account the possible effects of injunctive relief on copyrightable
expression-podcasts-would have weighted the dispute even
more strongly in favor of the podcasters. Such ex ante
considerations may have affected the initiation and direction of
the litigation, including the terms of the settlement.
Furthermore, altering patent law remedies in this way
may make an even greater difference in other scenarios.
Personal Audio, for instance, still has pending suits against the
likes of NBC and other larger media conglomerates. 364
Including potential negative effects on creative output within
362. Id.
363. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
364. Nazer, supra note 357. Some of these suits may be affected, however, by
the recent inter partes review finding that Personal Audio's podcasting patent is
invalid. See Joe Mullin, Infamous "Podcasting Patent" Knocked Out, ARs





the injunctive relief test may make denying injunctive relief
that much more justified in such scenarios. Furthermore, in
patent disputes between two practicing entities, taking into
account the potential effects on creative output may also
forestall granting injunctive relief where the public would be
harmed by virtue of no longer having access to that creative
output (rather than simply the allegedly infringing technology
itself).
In sum, judicial changes to standards for assessing patent
law remedies still fail to take into account those remedies'
effects on copyrightable expression. Under Rajec's reform
proposal, this remains so.365 This shortcoming seems justified
when viewing patent law in isolation. But when viewing it
within a broader, interdependent context, this myopic view of
patent law seems less justified. Indeed, as argued throughout
this Article, there are good reasons to ensure that both
copyright and patent law better reflect and facilitate the
traditional purposes of the other.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for adjusting both patent and
copyright laws to explicitly recognize and better achieve the
traditionally distinct purposes of the other. Doing so is justified
in terms of the U.S. Constitution as well as the interdependent
realities of creative and innovative activities, as discussed
above.
But the arguments of this Article should not be construed
as a call for complete fusion. Keeping the bodies of law
separate, with their distinct requirements and sets of rights,
may make sense in many cases in spurring different sorts of
activities that are socially valuable. In other words, intellectual
property law bifurcation often serves useful societal purposes.
In other cases, however, it may not. Indeed, ignoring the
effects that creative activity has on inventive activities, and
vice-versa, may mean that in many cases each body of law's
bifurcated rigidity results in societal losses as each fails to take
into account its contextual realities.
Some will certainly worry that taking such effects into
365. Rajec, supra note 184.
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consideration in adjusting copyright and patent law defenses
and remedies may undermine incentives to pursue
copyrightable and patentable activities. That is, intellectual
property law hybridization as discussed in this Article may in
some respects weaken rights under both copyright and patent
law by granting greater deference to considerations
traditionally outside of each body of law's scope. And this
weakening may disincentivize some parties from pursuing the
creative and inventive projects in the first place. Thus, from
this point of view, intellectual property law hybridization
undermines rather than expands intellectual property law's
collective capacities.
But the best way to avoid such potential issues is to
carefully circumscribe hybridization in ways that limit such ill
effects. This Article has offered two contexts in which some
limited intellectual property law hybridization would appear to
have positive net results.366 Indeed, in light of the
interdependent realities of creative and innovative activities,
adjusting each body of law to better respond to these realities
should prove beneficial to them. Or in other words, relaxing
each body of law's bifurcated harshness should provide
incentives of its own for additional interdependent creativity
and innovation, at least in contexts where creative and
inventive activities are highly interrelated. This incentives
story, in turn, may lend greater credence to the predominant
utilitarian theory behind each of copyright and patent law, so
long as each is properly calibrated to the other.
While this Article has confined its analysis to legal
hybridization in the intellectual property law context, legal
hybridization in other legal contexts may make sense as well.
Indeed, other scholars have already suggested some form of
hybridization in scenarios where two traditionally distinct
bodies of law may possess latent synergies. 367 Further study of
the interrelationships between traditionally distinct bodies of
366. But as others have argued elsewhere, without some amount of practical
experimentation, it is difficult a priori to conclusively state that this would be so.
See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patent Experimentalism, 101 VA. L. REV. 65,
87-88 (2015). But, per the arguments of this Article, there are certainly reasons
for optimism.
367. Stephanos Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and
Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL
L. REV. 1361, 1362-63 (2003).
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law-and how each might be adjusted to better support the
other without undermining the principal body of law-is thus a
worthwhile project not only for intellectual property law, but
for broader areas of the law as well.
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